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Crisis Manager of the American Revolution: Henry Laurens 
 
Jeffrey R Gudzune 
 
 
As President of the Continental Congress, Henry Laurens was a firm leader amid 
a time of national emergency.  When a dispute within the Continental Army threatened 
both the continuation of General Washington’s command and the American alliance with 
France, Laurens went beyond his limited sphere of political authority to settle the matter.  
When a peace commission from England arrived in the United States to begin discussing 
terms for an end to the hostilities, Laurens found himself in an increasingly difficult 
diplomatic situation.  While wrestling with the question of whether or not to accept the 
British offer, Laurens was also forced to hold the tenuous union of thirteen sovereign 
states together amid internal disputes, some of which had spilled over into the national 
government.  Throughout his term, Laurens stood out as an advocate for national 
unification against the British and contributed an essential service to the American 
Revolution. 
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 Henry Laurens did not seek a revolution, nor did he ask to be made President of 
the Continental Congress in 1777.  However, he was elected to the post and helped turn 
the tide of the American Revolution.  When all seemed lost, when the Continental Army 
was out of funds and fracturing into personal and political chaos, when Congress itself 
seemed on the verge of atrophy, he took action when action was most needed.  At this 
time, he emerged as a capable leader and crisis manager.  Though a stranger to the 
Continental Congress, Laurens distinguished himself as America’s most powerful 
advocate during the financial and interpersonal conflicts that faced the young 
confederation throughout the year 1777.  Henry Laurens was effective as a political 
leader, diplomat, and crisis manager during one of the most crucial years of the American 
Revolution, 1777-1778.     
 Henry Laurens’ contribution to the cause of American independence cannot be 
underestimated.  As President of the Continental Congress, Laurens led the American 
Confederation from November of 1777 until his resignation in December of 1778.  He 
guided the agenda of the Continental Congress and served as a conduit through which 
their deliberations reached the fledging nation.  Though he was wary of the dangers 
inherent in a war with Great Britain, Henry Laurens embraced the task to which he was 
elected.  His most significant contribution to the American Revolution was to stand 
behind General George Washington amid a controversy which grew from a dispute 
between Washington and General Thomas Conway.  What began as a personal conflict 
between two generals soon grew to threaten the stability of the Continental Army and 
posed a danger to the alliance with France.  Laurens advocated unity within the Congress 
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at a time when delegations were drifting away from their national responsibilities.  To 
deal with these and other problems during his term in office, Laurens drew on the 
experiences garnered in his early life in the mercantile industry, as well as his political 
background in the affairs of South Carolina.     
 While Henry Laurens’ service to the cause of independence is well documented, 
few historians have gone into detail regarding his political impact while serving as 
president of the Continental Congress or his later activities.  The literature surrounding 
Laurens and his life do not do justice to the full effect that the man had on the American 
Revolution.  In many books on the subject he is mentioned only in passing.  Authors like 
John Ferling and Joseph Ellis mention Laurens as president of the Continental Congress 
and then as a prisoner in the Tower of London, but they stop short of outlining his 
contributions.  The main biography of Henry Laurens, David Duncan Wallace’s The Life 
of Henry Laurens (New York: Russell and Russell, 1915), provides the most vivid detail 
about the man and his motivations during one of the most tumultuous years of the 
American Revolution.  In this now dated monograph, the author portrays a man of 
unquestionable abilities, but neglects a detailed account of his actions.  While Wallace 
provides a thorough historical timeline he neglects the overall effect of Laurens’ political 
decisions.  The evidence is presented in Wallace’s argument, but fails to draw the 
necessary conclusions based on Laurens’ actions.           
 Gregory Massey’s John Laurens and the American Revolution (Columbia: 
University of South Carolina Press, 2000) looks at Henry Laurens and his relationship 
with his oldest son.  While this book serves as a biography of the younger Laurens, it also 
includes insight into Henry Laurens and the effect of his political decisions on his 
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personal life.  The decisions that shaped Laurens’ political legacy during his tenure as 
president of Congress were made only after careful reflection on the issues at hand.  He 
did not easily arrive at these decisions as they concerned the future of a new nation.   
Scholarship regarding Henry Laurens usually presents him as a mediator in the 
debates of the Continental Congress.  His job was to chair the meetings of Congress, and 
nothing else.  As an executive, his authority was ill defined.  He most certainly did not 
possess the vast authority that George Washington would have when he became the first 
President under the Constitution of the United States.  However, Laurens’ private and 
public correspondence indicates that he was far more than a chairman--he was an active 
leader who took his responsibilities seriously.    
 Using these sources, it is easy to examine the political development of Henry 
Laurens from South Carolina merchant into an active proponent of the American 
Revolution.  He did not begin his service to the national government as a committed 
proponent of revolution.  However, as British taxation began to affect his life, Laurens 
began to change his opinions.  To fully understand the man and his motivations it is 
necessary to examine his early life in South Carolina and the events that surrounded his 
conversion.  This analysis will be a political biography exploring Henry Laurens in the 
roles of political leader, crisis manager, and diplomat.  It is evident from a detailed 
exploration of his personal and political correspondence that Henry Laurens gradually 
evolved into a revolutionary figure.  There is no example of a specific event that caused 
his change in thought.  Like his evolution into a prosperous merchant, Henry Laurens 
became a supporter of the American cause only after a series of events corrected the 
course of his development.     
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Chapter One: An Extraordinary Man 
Henry Laurens was born in Charles Town, South Carolina on March 6, 1724 to 
John and Esther Laurens.  John Laurens was a prosperous saddler, who had built a 
successful business that generated a comfortable living for him and his family.  His 
business efforts were so profitable that he was able to retire while still a relatively young 
man and devote the remainder of his life to public service as a church warden and fire 
master for Charles Town.1
 When Henry reached the age of twenty, he was dispatched to London to begin 
learning the merchant trade under James Crokatt, a man who had already achieved a great 
deal of success before transferring his business to London from South Carolina.  Laurens 
learned the intricacies of the mercantile industry under a most apt tutor.  Henry excelled 
in a field where it is essential for an individual to not only be a capable accountant, but a 
skilled organizer.  During his apprenticeship, Henry traveled widely with Crokatt’s 
shipments and communicated their safe arrival to his mentor.  The business contacts he 
made were integral to his success in later years.2
 Expectations do not always yield a positive result, as young Henry Laurens would 
find out after serving under Crokatt for three years.  It was his hope and indeed his 
expectation to achieve a partnership with his mentor.  Having both learned the details of 
the merchant trade and provided valuable service to Crokatt, Laurens felt that he was the 
perfect man for the task.3  However, no such partnership materialized and Laurens 
                                                          
 
1  David Duncan Wallace, The Life of Henry Laurens.  (New York: Russell and Russell, 1915), 13.   
2  Wallace, 15-16.   
3  Henry Laurens to James Crokatt, July 14, 1747, The Papers of Henry Laurens, Volume One: September 
11, 1746-October 31, 1755.  Philip M Hamer, ed.  2 vols.  (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 
1968), 1: 28-29.  Though Laurens would not openly aggrandize himself in front of his mentor, his service 
and dedication prove his desire to attain the partnership.   
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returned to South Carolina in 1747, unsure of his future.  Arriving in Charles Town, 
Henry learned that his father had died no more than four days before his ship arrived in 
port.  This news devastated the young man, who was now thrust into the arduous task of 
serving as executor of his late father’s will.  Around this same time, several letters arrived 
from London outlining the long anticipated partnership between Henry Laurens and 
James Crokatt--the good news coincided with the most devastating event of his young 
life.4   
 Writing to James Crokatt, Laurens confessed that he was “under great concern 
for” the loss of his father and lamented the fact that he had been unable to communicate 
with Crokatt.5  Working to fulfill his commitment to Crokatt while at the same time 
seeing that his father’s will was properly executed proved to be a task that drained him 
emotionally as well as physically.  In a letter to Richard Grubb, a partner to James 
Crokatt, Laurens said that since he was entrusted with the task of settling his father’s 
affairs, he had “scarcely the time to attend my own.”6  In a subsequent letter to Crokatt, 
Laurens confessed that he was exhausted from his endeavors, yet he was aware of his 
obligation to perform all his duties.  This is the first glimpse at Henry Laurens the task 
master, a quality he would continue to possess throughout his life and one that would 
become essential in his service during the American Revolution.7
                                                          
4  HL to James Crokatt, June 3, 1747, Papers.  Hamer, 1:3.   
5  Ibid, 1:3.  Laurens was writing his mentor in regard to his lack of communication concerning the 
shipments which he accompanied to South Carolina.  Not only was he responsible for assuring their safe 
arrival, but he was also vested with the task of distributing them to the various markets and securing 
payment.  This was a difficult time for the young man, having not only to cope with the loss of his father, 
but the added stress of competing in the market economy.      
6  HL to Richard Grubb, June 23, 1747, Papers.  Hamer, 1:8.  In this letter, the first evidence of strain is 
visible as Henry Laurens comments on how he has fallen behind in the execution of his other 
responsibilities--namely his duties to Crokatt and his personal life.  
7  HL to James Crokatt, June 24, 1747, Papers.  Hamer, 1:9-10.  This was not the last time Laurens 
performed multiple tasks. 
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 Laurens hoped to have his father’s estate settled so he could be in London by late 
April, 1748.  In his letters, Laurens refers to “the old scheme,” or partnership, with 
Crokatt.8  However, his pressing duties as executor of his father’s estate forced him to 
twice delay his departure from South Carolina.  As a means of gaining revenue and to 
keep up with the demands of the merchant industry, Laurens established a small store in 
Charles Town.  This business allowed him to remain in contact with prominent South 
Carolina merchants and prepared him to assume the desired partnership with Crokatt.  
Though Crokatt granted Laurens an extension to his April deadline, the former apprentice 
was unable to leave Charles Town until September 28, 1748.  In London, a series of 
unfortunate miscommunications and accusations of malfeasance made by Crokatt 
towards Laurens forever destroyed any chance of a business relationship.9    
 After his futile trip to London, Henry returned to South Carolina in 1749 and 
established a partnership with George Austin--it would soon prove to be a more 
fortuitous turn of events.10  His return to South Carolina was the beginning of many 
business and public associations that would lead him to an active role in the politics of his 
colony.        
 The firm of Austin and Laurens was successful.  They exported corn, rice, millet 
and indigo to British markets in London and throughout England, and then used the 
profits from these sales to import items into the colonial market.  South Carolina was in 
the midst of a booming economy as a result of trade with Great Britain and her 
                                                          
8  HL to Alexander Watson, August 25, 1747, Papers.  Hamer, 1:48.   
9  HL to Elizabeth Laurens, December 16, 1748, Papers.  Hamer, 1: 179.  Laurens was accused of not 
honoring his previous commitment to Crokatt.  However, he insisted that he acted in good faith. 
10  HL to Foster Cunliffe, January 20, 1749, Papers.  Hamer, 1: 203.  It is altogether fortunate that Laurens 
returned to South Carolina when he did and resolved to enter into a business relationship with Mr. Austin.  
Having already made numerous contacts throughout coastal North America, and having established himself 
in Charles Town, Laurens was now putting himself into a position of great importance.   
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dominions.11  Though the British Navigation Acts demanded that the majority of the 
export items went to the homeland, some goods were also sold to the more northern 
colonies of America and to the West Indies.  According to David Wallace, South 
Carolina was rapidly growing into an economic powerhouse in the mid eighteenth 
century.  A new generation of independently wealthy merchants and planters was taking 
hold in the colony, and Henry Laurens was one of the leaders of South Carolina society.  
Failure of the British to properly enforce the Navigation Acts allowed colonial merchants 
to increase their profits.12
 By the end of their first year in business, Austin and Laurens had established a 
successful import-export business.  The major import items were sugar, stationary, food 
products, beer, and clothing.13  By 1751, the firm imported indentured servants and black 
slaves, and advertising their services to the Charles Town community.  Laurens became a 
major player in the slave trade, an evil that had become necessary as South Carolina 
expanded its export industry, which was based on its plantation industry.  Laurens grew 
wealthy from the slave trade and other importers sought his advice.  Though he would 
one day lament his involvement, he made his fortune in the slave trade.14  His business 
efforts made Henry Laurens one of the richest men of South Carolina.      
 While Laurens was a member of a successful partnership, he frequently made his 
own investments and side agreements with his fellow merchants, as he had done while 
apprenticed to James Crokatt.  He sold rum, beer, animals skins, even imported marble 
                                                          
11  HL to Richard Farr, February, 18, 1749, Papers.  Hamer, 1:212.      
12  Wallace, 26-27.   
13  Advertisement, October 2, 1749, Papers.  Hamer, 1:240.   
14  Advertisement, October 23, 1751, Papers.  Hamer, 1:242.   
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facades for fireplaces to personal friends.15  To say that Henry Laurens was a busy man 
would not begin to describe the effort with which he embraced his responsibilities as a 
merchant.  Laurens was involved in every aspect of his profession, accounting, record-
keeping, communication, and networking with other merchants.  He traveled throughout 
Britain in search of the goods to import to South Carolina.  He did this not only while 
engaged in business for the firm of Austin and Laurens, but for his own private ventures.  
From his business records, it is clear that Laurens knew the location of every shipment 
and remained in constant communication with the ports receiving his merchandise.16
 Despite the complicated method through which items from one continent were 
purchased by merchants on another, a long and involved process that relied on payments 
sent through several intermediaries, Henry Laurens settled his accounts on time.17  This 
demonstrates the keen organizational skills requisite in a member of the merchant class, 
skills that Henry Laurens possessed and employed with vigor throughout his career.  
These skills became equally important in the decades to follow as Laurens confronted the 
task of building a nation out of thirteen sovereignties. 
 Despite the strenuous pace with which he embraced his business efforts, Laurens 
began a family.  On June 25, 1750, Henry Laurens married Eleanor Ball.18  With his 
business success, Laurens moved into a new social strata--one that coincided with South 
Carolina’s rise to economic prominence.  South Carolina society endeavored to copy that 
of London.  The wealthy planter elite and the merchant class had, in a generation, risen to 
                                                          
15  Wallace, 47. 
16  HL to William Whaley, May 12, 1755, Papers.  Hamer, 1:245.     
17  HL to John White, May 22, 1755, Papers.  Hamer, 1:251.   
18  Record of Marriage, June 25, 1750, Papers.  Hamer, 1:241.   
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the status of their counterparts in Britain, or so they believed.19  A new world was on the 
rise in the colonies, especially within South Carolina.  Henry Laurens was a part of a 
rising generation of successful, wealthy merchants whose involvement in the public life 
of the colony sustained that new world.   
 Having made a comfortable living for himself, Henry Laurens now turned to 
public service.  He was elected to the Commons House of Assembly of South Carolina in 
September of 1757.  The legislative body of South Carolina enjoyed a rich history of 
achieving its political goals over the royal governor, the crown’s representative.  The 
legislators acted independently of the will of the crown and dedicated their energies to 
sustaining the market economy of the colony.20  This was in part due to what Jack P. 
Greene refers to as “a marked correlation between” the rise in the colonial elite, most 
notably the merchants, and the rise in legislative authority.  In The Quest for Power, 
Greene notes that the colonial legislatures attained the upper hand with the royal 
governors due to a combination of economic and political factors.  In South Carolina, it 
was the independent will of the legislators, who gradually gained more control over 
economic factors without strong opposition from the royal administration.21             
 This was the world that Henry Laurens entered when he assumed the duties of his 
office.  South Carolina was separated from Great Britain by an ocean but linked to it by a 
very British ideology of legislative self determination and trade.  Furthermore, having to 
protect itself from territorial incursion from Indians gave South Carolina the opportunity 
                                                          
19  Jack P Greene, The Quest for Powers, the Lower Houses of Assembly in the Southern Royal Colonies: 
1689-1776.  (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1963), 5.   
20  Ibid, 9.     
21  Ibid, 11-12.   
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to develop both financially and politically.22  South Carolina needed a strong defense 
against the Cherokee, whose territories bordered the colony.  With the resumption of 
hostilities between Great Britain and France during the Seven Years’ War, this was a 
priority.  The Cherokee were a major power in the area.  South Carolina’s periodic 
encroachments into their territories made them more willing to ally themselves with 
France.23  
 Though peace had been maintained between South Carolina and the Cherokee due 
to previous negotiations directly with the British government, incursions by the colonists 
created a rift.24  Finally, in 1761, with threat following counter-threat, South Carolina was 
prepared to invade the Cherokee, augmented by a force of British troops sent by General 
Jeffrey Amherst.  Henry Laurens saw the dangers of an extended conflict with the 
Cherokee.  South Carolina did not posses the manpower to successfully defend itself 
from invasion and protracted warfare.  Such a conflict would have a negative impact on 
the entire colonial economy.25   
 Even before his election to Commons, Laurens expressed his views on the rising 
conflict with France.  After hearing rumors of the defeat and rout of Major General 
Edward Braddock’s forces near present day Pittsburgh in 1755, Laurens confessed to 
Walter Caddell that “such an event [another war with France] would disconcert all our 
schemes in North America.”  In this, he was referring to the continued existence of the 
                                                          
22  Greene, 298-300.  
23  Greene, 310-311.   
24  Wallace, 98-100.  Several Cherokee chiefs had negotiated an agreement with the British government in 
1730, which did not specify a border between the two sides.  With the natural population growth that 
accompanies a healthy economy, South Carolina began to expand into Cherokee territory.  Naturally, 
tensions rose and a conflict between the colonial troops and Cherokee warriors undermined the peace 
efforts.         
25  Wallace, 101.   
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colonies and South Carolina’s market economy.  Laurens, like any other businessman, 
was concerned not only with his colony but with the effect that a war would have on his 
business.26               
 To provide a strong defense, Laurens realized a more cohesive militia unit was 
necessary.  Writing to James Cowles in August of 1755, Laurens commented that 
General Braddock’s regular forces would have attained a larger degree of success had 
they pursued the war with colonial militia units as the primary body of troops.27  In fact, 
he continued to uphold this belief in subsequent correspondence.  Writing to business 
associates in England, Laurens again warned that allowing the French forces to advance 
down the Ohio and Mississippi valleys threatened the security of the colonists and the 
economy of North America.28  In truth, colonial militia units were a part of General 
Braddock’s army in 1775.  However, conflicts between colonial militias and British 
regulars prevented a cohesive military unit from being formed.  These problems were an 
extension of the intrinsic political conflicts between the colonial assemblies and the 
British government over the funding of the war effort.  As a legislator, Laurens was 
aware of the problems but did not perceive them to be an aggravating factor.29    
 In his letter to Devonsheir, Reeve, and Lloyd, Laurens advocated a colonial union.  
“Were the several provinces to unite in their strength,” he argued, ”we should be able to 
do anything.”  There were other leaders throughout North America who felt this way, but 
Laurens warned that due to the diverse natures of the various colonial governments, no 
such coalition would be plausible until “an apparent danger of the whole shall drive them 
                                                          
26  HL to Walter Caddell, August 15, 1755, Papers.  Hamer, 1:319.   
27  HL to James Cowles, August 20, 1755, Papers.  Hamer, 1:321.  
28  HL to Devonsheir, Reeve, and Lloyd, August 20, 1755, Papers.  Hamer, 1:321. 
29  Douglas Edward Leach, Roots of Conflict: British Armed Forces and Colonial Americans, 1677-1763.  
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to the necessity of it.”30  In fact, such an idea had been discussed and rejected by the 
colonies in 1754.  Meeting in Albany, New York, the colonies had unanimously rejected 
a plan of union proposed by Pennsylvania’s Benjamin Franklin and Massachusetts 
Governor William Shirley.31  Experiencing a great deal of frustration at the way the 
British government was pursuing the war, and concerned with the future of his colony’s 
economy, Laurens continued to voice his opinions on how the war should be prosecuted.  
As fate would have it, his election to the Commons House in 1757 allowed Laurens to 
publicly express his feelings on the war.   
 It was during his service in the colonial legislature that Henry Laurens became a 
fierce advocate for a stronger defense of South Carolina’s borders.  Distrustful of what 
the Cherokee might do in the event of French overtures, Laurens felt the necessity of 
securing the border and preparing for the worst.  Seeing that the public treasury was taxed 
to its limits, Laurens and other successful South Carolina merchants agreed to contribute 
funds to the war effort, an action that was widely noted and lauded at the time.32                    
 Throwing his energies into providing South Carolina with a strong defense, Henry 
Laurens was appointed a lieutenant colonel in the colonial militia on September 16, 1760.  
His commission, signed by Lieutenant Governor William Bull, charged him with the task 
of organizing a unit of one thousand soldiers.  This unit was to be raised to defend South 
Carolina against a potential invasion by the Cherokee nation.33  Though he was re-elected 
to the Commons in 1760, he was unable to take his seat as he was preoccupied with his 
                                                                                                                                                                             
(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1986.), 164-165.   
30  HL to Devonsheir, Reeve, and Lloyd, August 20, 1755, Papers.  Hamer, 1:321-322.   
31  Joseph L. Davis, Sectionalism in American Politics: 1774-1787.  (Madison: The University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1977), 12.   
32  Public Subscription, November 17, 1759, The Papers of Henry Laurens, Volume Three: January 1, 
1759-August  31, 1763.  Philip M Hamer, ed.  2 vols.  (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 
1972), 3:16.    
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military duties.34  South Carolina’s Gazette credits Laurens with being the most 
successful militia recruiter within the colony.35  Another report indicates that Laurens 
made efforts to recruit soldiers from North Carolina as well and that he met with the 
Catawba ruler, King Haigler.36  The purpose of this meeting was to gain assurances from 
the Catawba ruler that the colonists could count on their support against the French.  King 
Haigler assured Laurens that his people would maintain peaceful relations with the 
British and that they would not be swayed by French overtures.  This was enough to 
mollify Laurens and the meeting was reported in the Gazette as “a good talk.”37  
Eventually, drawing from both North and South Carolina, Henry Laurens created a 
militia unit of twelve hundred able men to serve as a buffer.38  
 The militia unit, sponsored and recruited by Laurens, engaged in prolonged 
warfare with the Cherokee during the year 1761.  Though Laurens was not an active 
participant in the actual battles with the Cherokee, he did accompany the militia to 
reconnoiter through their territory and was vested with the responsibility of safeguarding 
close to one thousand sick and wounded soldiers.  In a letter to Reverend John Ettwein, 
Laurens describes how the colonial militia marched “for the middle settlements of the 
Cherokee Nation, holding the olive branch in one hand and the [word missing] of cruel 
war in the other, leaving the choice to be made by the people who dwelt there.”39   
                                                                                                                                                                             
33  Commission as Lieutenant Colonel, September 16, 1760, Papers.  Hamer, 3:46.    
34  Appendix listing of Henry Laurens and his actions in the Commons House, Papers.  Hamer, 3:561.  This 
session of the House began in October of 1760 and ended in February of 1761.  The house journal lists 
Laurens as being re-elected to his seat, but requesting leave to pursue his militia activities.  Among his 
many duties, Laurens was also vested with the task of finding funds for the newly established militia unit.       
35  Newspaper Accounts, October 26, 1760, Papers.  Hamer, 3:52-53.  There are several accounts from the 
Gazette included in this collection of Henry Laurens’ papers.  For the most part, the newspaper articles 
indicate his degree of success while recruiting for the South Carolina militia.   
36  Newspaper Accounts, February 7, 1761, Papers.  Hamer, 3:59.   
37  Ibid, 3:34.   
38  Wallace, 101.   
39  HL to John Ettwein, July 17, 1761, Papers.  Hamer, 3:73-74.   
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 The Cherokee apparently chose war.  Perhaps because of the cruelty with which 
the colonial militia eventually subdued the Cherokee, the colony of South Carolina was 
secure in her borders for the duration of the Seven Years’ War.40  When the Cherokee 
nation was forced to sue for peace, Laurens was one of the members of the Commons 
House who escorted the delegation to the temporary capital of South Carolina, Shem 
Town.  The Commons was forced to relocate to the northwest due to an outbreak of 
yellow fever in Charles Town.41  With little choice, given the destruction brought to their 
settlements, the Cherokee agreed to the terms set forth by the colony.  Attakullakulla, one 
of the principal chiefs of the Cherokee Nation, agreed to accept the partition of some of 
his lands to establish a border with South Carolina.42     
 With the 1763 end of the Seven Years’ War, Laurens was able to devote more 
time to his profitable business efforts and return to his seat in the Commons.  It was 
during this time, 1763 until 1775, that the Commons enhanced its power and finally 
asserted its independence from the crown.  The Commons had always exerted its will 
over the royal administration by insisting that it had the right to appoint revenue 
collectors and control the public funds used to pay crown appointed officials, including 
the royal governor’s salary.43  Disputes over the appointment of judges and the right of 
the legislature to issue money further aggravated the situation.44   
                                                          
 
40  Wallace, 102.  In June of 1761, a regiment under the command of Colonel James Grant pushed deep into 
Cherokee territory and conducted a scorched earth policy against the towns and villages that they 
encountered.  This campaign is said to have lasted thirty days and inflicted great damage to the Cherokee 
nation.     
41  Preliminary Negotiations with the Cherokee, September 10-22, 1761, Papers.  Hamer, 3: 83.  Laurens is 
mentioned as the person responsible for delivering the records of the preliminary negotiations conducted in 
the field with the Cherokee leader, Attakullakulla, to Lieutenant Governor Bull and the Commons House.   
42  Wallace, 102.  
43  Greene, 358.   
44  Ibid, 402-403. 
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 Such quarrels were not new to South Carolina politics, and the Commons had 
usually attained the upper hand--a fact which Laurens noted quite frequently.  Even as 
early as 1747, Henry Laurens was aware of the distrust with which the people of South 
Carolina viewed the colonial administration.  “The people of the Province are generally 
very fickle,” he wrote to Reverend Richard St. John in November of 1747, “…especially 
in respect to Governors Spiritual or Temporal, soon pleased and soon disgusted.”45  
Though he wrote this letter to his friend in confidence, Laurens was aware that the 
interest of colonists and crown representatives often diverged.  As the people became 
more and more dissatisfied with British authority, the Commons House in South Carolina 
gained importance.    
 As a result of the prolonged war with France, Great Britain found itself in an 
increasingly difficult financial situation.  King George III referred to the Seven Years’ 
War as a “bloody and expensive” conflict.  Though the British were victorious and the 
American colonies secured, the king forced the resignations of the spendthrift ministers 
who had prosecuted the war and caused a debt of over 130 million pounds.  What 
followed would bring even more tension between the colonies and the British 
government.46   
 As a result of a prosperous trade with Great Britain, the American colonies had 
enjoyed a great degree of economic success.  This trade was guided by the Navigation 
Acts, a series of laws governing the shipping industry.  Though the Navigation Acts were 
originally created to bolster the English shipping industry as it faced Dutch competition, 
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they provided a secure system of exchange between the territories of Great Britain.47  The 
acts were meant to assure that certain export items from the colonies were shipped on 
English vessels, by English crews, and only to English ports.48  Colonial merchants were 
required to attain bonds and certificates attesting that the vessels they were using were 
English and that their destinations were ports in possession of the British empire.  In the 
years before the Seven Years‘ War, the British government allowed the colonies to 
engage in an indirect trade with one another.  This lead to a period of economic 
expansion that allowed the colonies to prosper.49
 By 1763, the period of unchecked economic and political development had 
become widely noticed within the British empire.  Oliver Dickerson describes an 
America on the rise, benefiting from trade with Great Britain and growing into thirteen 
independent political entities.50  Meanwhile, England was recovering from the financial 
effects of another war with France.  Dickerson describes the series of legislation that 
followed as a reorganization of colonial America.51  Government ministers and British 
merchants had seen the rapid political development that had accompanied colonial 
expansion as an affront to the power of the Parliament to regulate trade, and thereby 
govern the colonies.52                    
 In 1764, the British Parliament passed the Sugar Act, which required a duty of 
three pence to be paid on items imported from French or Dutch merchants.  Included in 
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the list of taxable commodities were molasses, coffee, and sugar.53  Violators of this act 
would be subject to prosecution in Vice-Admiralty courts.54  In 1765, the Parliament 
adopted the Stamp Act, which required a tax to be paid on all legal documents, playing 
cards, newspapers, and dice.55  Vice-Admiralty courts began to enforce the Navigation 
Acts on colonial merchants who, in the past, had sidestepped English regulations.  It was 
customary for merchants sending goods from one colony to another to attain a bond to 
assure that their goods would be shipped according to the Navigation Acts.  Henry 
Laurens always attained the required bonds.56         
 The Stamp Act caused more of an uproar throughout the American colonies than 
had the previous Sugar Act.  In South Carolina, Henry Laurens was confronted with a 
crisis of conscience regarding the Stamp Act.  While he recognized that the legislation 
threatened the economy of South Carolina, he did not advocate the public upheaval that it 
caused.  He was right to be concerned, as a series of riots and public demonstrations 
against the bill spread throughout Charles Town in October of 1765.  Tax collectors were 
hanged in effigy, bitter diatribes were directed at the royal governor, and the city entered 
a period of paranoia over the implementation of this most unpopular legislation.57   
 Though Henry Laurens was not a party to the collection of taxes through the 
Stamp Act, he was nonetheless a victim of the misdirected rage of his fellow colonists.  
On October 23, 1765, Laurens was confronted by an unruly mob of colonists who 
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believed that he was holding the stamp seals sent from Great Britain.  Startled awake in 
the early hours of the morning, Laurens confronted the assembled colonists.  To make 
matters worse, Eleanor Laurens was eight months pregnant and quite ill.58  Laurens later 
commented that he knew several of the individuals who were demanding entrance to his 
home, despite their disguises.59  The mob insisted that Laurens was in possession of the 
offending stamp paper and resolved to search his house--an action he would not consent 
to, vowing to seek satisfaction with any who dared cross his threshold.  While the 
accusations of those angry colonists were untrue, Laurens was still forced to mollify the 
crowd.60   
 Having justified his position by pointing to his own public statements against the 
Stamp Act, Laurens insisted that the crowd disperse.61  This incident represents the 
paranoia that spread throughout the citizenry of South Carolina as legislation from Britain 
began to have a more visible impact on colonial society.  While Henry Laurens also 
viewed this action as an encroachment of the long enjoyed liberties of the colonists, he 
did not condone violent street action.  What occurred at the Laurens’ residence was 
hardly an isolated incident.  Throughout the American colonies, there were similar riots 
and assaults on tax collectors.  The tide of discontent washed over the citizens of the 
thirteen colonies.62  In October of 1765, a conference of colonial representatives was 
called by the Massachusetts legislature for the express purpose of discussing the 
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situation.  Nine of the thirteen colonies sent representatives to the Stamp Act Congress, 
which met in New York City.63  While Laurens was not in favor of the Stamp Act, he 
could not support the creation of such an extra-legal body.  He furthermore refused to 
sign the resolves of South Carolina’s Committee of Correspondence, which updated her 
agents in London as to the situation in the colonies.64   
 In New York City, the Stamp Act Congress drafted a series of resolutions 
outlining their position against the legislation.65  After the repeal of the Stamp Act in 
1766, a new series of problems came to light along with a new colonial resolve.  Laurens 
foresaw these problems when he received word of Parliament’s decision that it “had a 
right to Tax the Colonies.”66       
 The Declaratory Acts of 1766, passed the same day that Parliament repealed the 
Stamp Act, asserted the authority of Parliament over the colonial governments.67  The 
Townshend Acts, adopted in 1767, imposed a duty on various imports for the purpose of 
paying the salaries of royal officials in the colonies.  Riots and demonstrations filled the 
streets of America’s major cities, as civil unrest and political dissent became a concerted 
public outcry.  Writing to Lachlan McIntosh, Laurens commented that his colony would 
“not subscribe to the right of a British Parliament to lay internal taxes upon America.”  
He concluded that South Carolina, like all the other colonies, would “sullenly and 
stubbornly resist against all ministerial mandates and admonitions tendering to enslave 
them.”68  In 1768, the South Carolina Commons and Governor Charles Greville Montagu 
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clashed over the legality of Parliament’s decision to legislate for the colonies.  When the 
governor dissolved the house in November, the legislative discontent continued when it 
reconvened in August.  At its inaugural meeting, the Commons adopted a plan of non-
importation of British goods in protest of the Townshend Acts--similar agreements were 
made by other colonies throughout the year.69  During the next two years, Laurens 
demonstrated a dedication to the non-importation agreement, claiming it was a lawful 
assertion of colonial rights.70         
 At this time, Laurens himself became a victim of the Navigation Acts.  Several of 
Laurens’ shipments were stopped at their ports and his vessel, the Wambaw, was seized at 
Charles Town harbor.  Although, Laurens had purchased the bond required by law and 
forwarded it to the appropriate customs official, his vessel was still held at port.  Laurens 
was forced to pay court costs for his efforts to set the situation right, a common 
occurrence in both the Carolinas.71              
 Other prominent merchants experienced similar treatment, with shipments 
detained by royal customs officials.  Despite a series of protests to the ministry sent to 
South Carolina’s colonial agent in London, Charles Garth, the British government did 
nothing to rectify the situation.  Tensions rose and Laurens was challenged to a duel by 
customs collector Daniel Moore, who had held his ships at port.  Moore avoided the 
appointment and fled to Georgia; he was relieved of his position in 1769.72  There were 
other conflicts between royal officials and merchants in South Carolina from 1763 to 
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1776--widening the rift between the royal government and the colonists.73    
 Manifestos and bitter diatribes were exchanged between the colonial assemblies 
and the crown appointed administrators throughout the remainder of the 1760s.  Attitudes 
were changing as a result of British policy.  Merchants and political leaders of the colony 
became dissatisfied with their status within the empire.  This issue pushed South Carolina 
and other colonies towards independence.  A coastal market economy in which the 
independent merchants reigned now found itself subject to the dictates of royal 
appointees.  This was not acceptable for South Carolina and most certainly not for men 
like Henry Laurens.74
 Another shake up in the British government found one Prime Minster being 
ushered out the door while another was stepping up to take charge.  In March of 1770, 
Lord North repealed all of the duties imposed by the Townshend Acts, except for the one 
on the importation of tea.75  Though Henry Laurens had always advised caution when it 
came to confronting the British government, he was also an avid proponent of local 
government and he considered the Townshend duties an affront to South Carolina’s 
legislative independence.76  While the American colonies were British territories, and the 
colonists British subjects, they were also a part of a new cultural identity that was taking 
shape.77  In Becoming America, Jon Butler discusses the rise of this new identity as being 
part of a gradual process.  As a result of the combination of various nationalities, and the 
isolation from Great Britain itself, society in the thirteen colonies had been reshaped into 
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something different from that of the British.  The colonies developed their own 
economies, their own political traditions, and their own cultural identity.78
 Cautious in his approach to anything resembling separation, Laurens warned of 
possible dangers.  He disapproved of rioting and acts of violence, favoring discourse and 
diplomacy as the only ways to achieve a desired end.  He supported the colonies in the 
adoption of the non-importation act in 1768, a legal protest to the taxation of items such 
as tea, glass, and paper.79  However, the repeal of all the Townshend duties, save the one 
on tea, did not improve the situation in the colonies.80  Laurens approved of non-
importation, despite personal financial loss, until the colony of South Carolina abandoned 
the plan in December of 1770.  However, it is clear from his writings that the act had an 
impact on his standard of living.  “I am not worth so many pounds, shillings, and pence 
as you knew me worth in April, 1764,” he wrote to George Appleby in September of 
1769.  During the non-importation agreement, Laurens survived by selling the crops 
grown at his home, Mepkin Plantation; but his import business was seriously effected.81  
Nonetheless, Henry Laurens endured.82
 As the situation in the colonies grew worse, Laurens elected to dedicate his 
energies to achieving from Great Britain a more conciliatory policy towards North 
America.  In letters to business associates in London, as well as to South Carolina’s 
colonial agent, Laurens warned of the ever increasing dangers of suppressing American 
autonomy.  While he never espoused independence, he did fully embrace the concept of 
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America as a self-governing entity within Great Britain.  This was not a new concept, nor 
was it a construct wholly of South Carolina, but was a rapidly growing belief among 
many colonists.83   
 The tense situation within the thirteen colonies and the death of his wife, Eleanor, 
in 1770 gave impetus to Laurens’ decision to relocate to England.  In 1771, Henry 
Laurens took up residence in London to see to the education of two of his sons, John and 
James.  His time in London gave him the opportunity to evolve personally as well as 
politically and alter some of his views on the state of affairs between the colonies and 
Great Britain.84   
 Laurens found that the academic institutions in London did not provide the 
education that he wished his sons to have.  He therefore sent John and James to a school 
in Geneva, Switzerland, where science and mathematics were stressed and moral virtues 
were rigidly enforced.  This, he felt, would provide his sons with a well rounded 
education and prepare them for life in a civilized society.85  Laurens lauded the studious 
nature of the Swiss instructors, whom he saw as paragons of virtue.  It was only after the 
boys had completed their schooling in Switzerland that Laurens resolved to further their 
education in England.  By this time, his ten year old son, also named Henry, had joined 
them.86     
 Though he was re-elected to the Commons in 1772, he was unable to return from 
England and would most likely have declined the offer had the royal governor not once 
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more dissolved the house.87  Laurens continued to advocate colonial rights to members of 
Parliament and observed the political situation in Great Britain.88  Returning to South 
Carolina in November of 1774, Laurens was subsequently elected to the First Provincial 
Congress, which was established to enforce the non-importation of tea from Great 
Britain.89  By the summer of 1774, a general call for representatives expanded this body 
into an assembly of over one-hundred colonists.  After redistricting and agreeing on a 
parliamentary format, the organization became a legislature in January of 1775.  Though 
they were not quite ready to supplant the royal administration, the colonial 
representatives present were preparing to assert their long upheld belief of self-
determination.           
 In a letter to his son, John, Laurens asks the student’s counsel regarding the 
colonial determination “to make a firm and steady opposition to the measures adopted by 
administration for enslaving us and our property.”90  Laurens referred to the creation of 
the First Continental Congress and its assertion that the colonists alone could legislate for 
the individual colonies.  This was not only a bold move by the colonists, but was treason 
in the eyes of any loyal Englishman.  The congress, however, invoked English law in this 
assertion and claimed that as part of that canon, the “people have a right to participate in 
their legislative council.”91  With the petition by the congress to the people of Great 
Britain, Laurens soon saw that the situation would not quickly mend itself.   
 With the decision of the First Continental Congress to adopt measures that barred 
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the importation of British goods, and the widening gap between the mother country and 
the colonies, Laurens feared not only for his homeland but for businesses.92  The next 
stage of Laurens’ political evolution began in 1775, as he moved toward revolution.  
With all the colonies suffering “violations of faith and credit” and being “unjustly treated 
by the mother country,” Laurens was uncertain over which path to take.  He confesses his 
feelings to a friend living in London, hoping “that the wisdom of your new Parliament 
will deliver us from the deplorable state to which we are reduced by the folly of their 
predecessors.”93                       
 Though the Provincial Congress of South Carolina styled itself the legislature of 
the colony, there was no legal basis for such a claim.  This body nonetheless operated as 
a government body, even providing for representatives to be dispatched to the Second 
Continental Congress.  Though Laurens was wary of the dangers of any military conflict 
with Great Britain, he nonetheless stood up for the rights he believed that colonies 
possessed--the most sacred of these, the right to self-determination of economic and 
political affairs.94  As each day brought more news of the rising tide of dissent within the 
colonies, South Carolina moved nearer to chaos.  The Provincial Congress gradually took 
over the powers presumably exercised by the Commons House.  This was the revolution 
as it started in South Carolina, with a new legislature at the head of an emerging state.95   
 In a letter to his son, John, Laurens bewailed the course his colony was taking and 
confessed that he wept for the circumstances that provoked the leaders of his colony to 
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choose such a course.  “I feel for the distress of my country,” he wrote, “I weep for the 
horrid effects of civil discord which must soon be produced if we proceed in our contest 
with Great Britain.”96  His letters throughout the year 1775 reflect his concern over the 
rise of dissent among the colonists, the landing of British troops on North American soil, 
and even the potential for armed conflict.97   
 As the fledgling revolutionary government of South Carolina grew, Henry 
Laurens continued to serve as a more moderate voice in the affairs of state, yet always 
insisting that the colonies had the right to legislate for themselves.  When the Provincial 
Congress ordained a Council of Safety in June of 1775, to provide leadership for the 
colony during its recess, Henry Laurens was elected president.  At the inaugural meeting 
of this body, regulations for the governing of the colonial militia were established and a 
general treasury was created to provide funds to operate the government.98  Like his 
contemporaries in the business elite, Henry Laurens wished to avoid war and seek out 
political reconciliation.  Indeed, these were the thoughts that he expressed to his business 
associates in London as well as to his most trusted confidante, his son, John. 
 This was not a new concept, nor was it considered altogether foolish given the 
circumstances surrounding the rebellion in North America.  Aside from the obvious fears 
that such a war aroused, namely thirteen colonies battling what was considered to be the 
greatest empire in the world, there were also economic considerations.  The colonies had 
benefited from their relationship with Great Britain and had, for the most part, enjoyed a 
lengthy period of economic prosperity.  Consequently, a war with the mother country 
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would shut down the harbor towns of South Carolina, which were the life blood of the 
colony’s economy.99  Laurens and other members of South Carolina’s merchant class felt 
this sting as 1775 drew to its close.     
 As president of the Council of Safety, Laurens oversaw the raising of troops for 
the protection of South Carolina and the dispersal of funds to provide for the arming and 
clothing of those troops.100  With the beginning of the Second Provincial Congress on 
November 1 of 1775, Laurens remained active in the legislative affairs of his colony, 
serving on several important finance committees.  When the first session of the Second 
Provincial Congress adjourned on November 29, 1775, the government of the colony was 
once more left to the Council of Safety.  Council president Henry Laurens continued his 
defensive preparations.101  During this time, British vessels were expelled from the 
harbors of South Carolina and a series of fortifications were built for the purposes of 
defense.  Revolution had begun and the rift between the colony and the mother country 
was widening.102               
 Throughout the final months of 1775, Laurens and the Council of Safety were 
engaged in preparing for war with Great Britain.  The colonists erected forts, raised 
militia units, and dispersed funds to support the defense of the state.  The situation was 
grave as Laurens warned of the eminent arrival of British warships.103  To make his 
burden worse, Laurens received word that his son, James, had died suddenly in London 
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in September of 1775.104  Grieved, he was forced to bear this sorrow as well as the mantle 
of leadership.  As loyalist regiments prepared to battle the colonists, South Carolina 
exchanged its provincial status for a new designation--independent state.  The machinery 
of war had been prepared and though Laurens feared the result, he endeavored to defend 
his charge.105
 When the Second Provincial Congress reconvened in February of 1776, it quickly 
took up the duties of government for the colony.  The body was aided in this endeavor by 
the absence of Governor Lord William Campbell, who had fled to the newly arrived 
warship Cherokee in Charles Town harbor over fears of a popular uprising.  The Council 
of Safety had made adequate defensive preparations during the recess, while at the same 
time entreating Lord William to return and make peace with the colonists.  In a letter 
addressed to the governor, Laurens requested Campbell return to the capital, provided he 
“take no active part against the good people of this colony.”106  Having no interference 
from the royal administration, the Provincial Congress moved to solidify the break with 
the mother country.  After intense debate over the powers and functions of the entities of 
statehood, the congress “metamorphosed in the twinkling of an eye into a General 
Assembly, from whence a President and Commander-in-Chief, Vice-president and Privy 
Council, a Legislative Council and divers officers of state have been chosen by ballot.”107
 Despite his best efforts to prevent this, Laurens was elected to the post of Vice-
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president of the newly styled state of South Carolina.  “I went so far yesterday,” he 
confessed to his son, John, “as to retire from the House under this declaration that I 
would not serve, whether another has been chosen I know not.”108  After the adoption of 
the South Carolina constitution, Laurens continued to maintain hope that the grievances 
between Great Britain and the mother country would be resolved.109  Laurens did not 
advocate revolution; seeing the dangers of such a contest, he still entertained hopes for a 
reconciliation with the mother country.  When he received word of the adoption of the 
Declaration of Independence by the Continental Congress, he lamented that the action 
was made necessary.110
 Henry Laurens was not born a revolutionary.  He was a product of the era in 
which he lived.  As a merchant, he felt his livelihood endangered by the incursions of the 
British Parliament.  As a political leader in South Carolina, he viewed the assertion of 
Parliamentary power over the colonies as an infringement of American rights.  Laurens 
did not start out as an advocate of separation, in fact he preferred reconciliation over 
absolute independence.  In his thinking, the colonies already possessed the right to 
legislate for themselves.  As an integral part of the British empire, the colonies of North 
America were a new frontier.  In the mind of men like Henry Laurens, the British 
Parliament’s decision to impose taxes on the colonies represented a gross abuse of 
legislative authority.  As the door was closed on the issue of reconciliation, Laurens 
moved into the next stage of his public evolution. 
 On January 10, 1777, Henry Laurens collided with his destiny and began the most 
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challenging endeavor of his public life.  “I am ordered to the Congress of the United 
States,” he wrote to John Laurens in February of 1777, “I said it would be impossible for 
me with any propriety to leave this place before the month of May, the vote was 
confirmed, I call it therefore as I feel it, a Command--I go.”  Elected as one of South 
Carolina’s delegates to the Second Continental Congress, Laurens grudgingly accepted 
this “command” and set his affairs in order for the journey to Philadelphia.111  His 
previous experience and service to the public had conspired to prepare him for the task 
that awaited him.  However, in the months to come he would face his most difficult 
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Chapter Two: A Harsh Winter  
 Henry Laurens viewed his election to the Continental Congress as an arduous 
“command” that must be obeyed despite the personal sacrifice involved.  Eleanor Ball 
Laurens had died in 1770, leaving Henry Laurens a widower.  With the death of James 
and having to see to the education of John Laurens, Henry Laurens was pulled in several 
directions.  His personal concerns were heightened by business problems caused by the 
conflict with Great Britain.  Military concerns added to Laurens’ cares as he strove to 
secure South Carolina’s borders.  It is understandable that he viewed his election to the 
Congress with dread.  Moreover, a series of troubling events were beginning to threaten 
the stability of the American Confederation, not to mention the war effort.  Lack of 
supplies and financial deficiencies, compounded with a serious dispute over the future of 
General Washington’s command, endangered the success of the American cause.  In 
Congress, Laurens overcame his personal concerns to provide the firm leadership that 
America needed to overcome this and other crises. 
 Arriving in Philadelphia on July 21, 1777, Laurens quickly learned of the 
approaching danger posed by British forces.  “We are assured from good authority that 
this city is the object of the campaign,” he wrote to John Lewis Gervais in reference to 
the reports of General Sir William Howe’s movements toward the capital.112  In this same 
letter, Laurens discusses the need for alliances with European nations.  Thinking of the 
future of the country, Laurens realized that the states would need financial as well as 
military assistance from nations such as France, Spain, and the German states.113  Indeed, 
his actions throughout the coming year were motivated by his concern for the financial 
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strain placed on the general government by the war with Great Britain.        
 The necessity of negotiating an alliance with France gave Laurens the most 
concern.  The two major issues faced by Laurens in the early months of his presidency 
threatened that alliance.  As a result of the machinations of Silas Deane, who had been 
appointed by the congress to assist Benjamin Franklin in France, Philadelphia was 
overrun by French nobles seeking commissions in the Continental Army.  Deane had 
promised several influential nobles commissions as a means of gaining support from the 
French government.114  While Laurens agreed that worthy French officers might assist the 
Continental Army, he did not approve of Deane’s actions because it placed Congress in 
an awkward position.  As Laurens explained in his letter to John Lewis Gervais, “if we 
employ [the Frenchmen] with all his unwarranted contracts, many of our best generals 
will be grossly affronted.”  However, Laurens realized that if congress refused to 
accommodate these individuals, the potential for an alliance with France could be put in 
grave jeopardy.115   
 When it became apparent that the Continental Congress could not accommodate 
every request, angry letters from distraught commission seekers were sent to 
Philadelphia.  This discontent led Laurens to consider the potential for “disparaging 
reports of Congress at the Court of France,” which would negatively affect the French 
view of the United States.  Laurens confessed that the proper course of action would be to 
remove Silas Deane from his position as a Commissioner to France and replace him with 
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another representative.116    
 Laurens did understand the importance of advancing some worthy foreign 
individuals such as the Marquis de Lafayette, whom Laurens felt was a dedicated patriot.  
In the next few months his interaction with the Marquis developed into a personal 
friendship.117   
 Three weeks into his congressional service, Laurens noticed a serious deficiency 
in the way in which the Continental Congress managed the affairs of the nation.  With 
conflicting reports from General Washington of the disposition of British forces further 
complicating the situation, Laurens began to express his concerns over the future of the 
American Revolution.  New York was occupied by the British under General Sir William 
Howe, its harbor blockaded by warships under the command of Admiral Richard Howe.  
The Commander-in-Chief of the Continental Army, General George Washington, was 
trapped in New Jersey and in desperate need of money.118  Knowing that General Howe 
had advanced towards Philadelphia, the Continental Congress began to make a 
contingency plan should the seat of government be occupied.119  “Congress in the present 
situation of affairs think it necessary to prepare for adjourning to Lancaster,” Laurens 
wrote to George Galphin in September of 1777, “…perhaps before sun rise tomorrow, I 
shall be on my journey.”120   
 As a precautionary measure, several members of the Continental Congress left the 
city.  “We keep enough to make a Congress, and that’s all,” Laurens wrote to John Lewis 
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Gervais, “I shall remain as long as any--I sent my baggage forward some days ago and 
can easily transport myself.”121  While the simple majority that remained in the capital 
began to debate “the weighty business of confederation,” Laurens kept one eye on his 
flight and the other on the duties at hand.122  When it became apparent that General Howe 
and his forces were close to Philadelphia, Laurens was one of the last members of the 
Continental Congress to vacate the city.123
 After his arrival in Lancaster, Pennsylvania, the seat of government for the exiled 
Continental Congress, Laurens appraised the leadership of his state of the situation.  In a 
letter to John Lewis Gervais, Laurens describes his calm withdrawal from Philadelphia, 
along with many of the town’s patriot residents.  “Thousands of all sorts in all 
appearances past by in such haste,” he wrote, “that very few could be prevailed on to 
answer to the simple question, what news?”  “I, however, would not fly,” he concluded, 
“I stayed breakfast and did not proceed till 8 o’clock.”   
While exiting the city, Laurens happened by the wounded Marquis de Lafayette, 
who had been struck by a British musket ball during the battle of Bristol.  Laurens’ 
respect for the young Marquis’ leadership abilities and courage increased after this 
meeting.  He safely deposited the young French soldier in the city of Bethlehem before 
joining the rest of the Congress at Lancaster on September 27, 1777.124   
 Laurens began communicating with the Marquis after learning of his swift 
recovery from his wounds, informing the Frenchman that his belongings and 
correspondence were being sent to him in the field.  Praising his actions in the recent 
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battle, and lauding him for his swift recovery, Laurens made efforts to develop a cordial 
relationship with Lafayette.  This action was motivated by his personal interest in the 
young man, but it also worked to cement relationships between France and the United 
States.  Lafayette’s support and considerable wealth were important factors in 
maintaining a positive relationship.125    
 After realizing that Lancaster would not support the departments of the 
government, the Congress elected to set up a capital in the city of York, Pennsylvania.  
On September 27, 1777, the Continental Congress resolved “that the Treasury Board 
direct the treasurer, with all his papers, forms, etcetera to repair to the town of York.”126  
Moving the various records and personnel proved difficult but altogether necessary.  It 
was at York that the Continental Congress lost one of its oldest proponents, and would 
gain one of its most dedicated leaders.  John Hancock resigned as President of the 
Continental Congress on October 31, 1777, leaving vacant the post he had occupied for 
over two years.  The congressional record for that day gives no intimation as to why the 
president would relinquish his duties.  The record only states that Hancock stated that he 
had served in the capacity long enough.127  On November 1, 1777, Delegate Henry 
Laurens was elected to fill this void.  As an outsider in national affairs, Laurens was not 
an outspoken member of the Continental Congress.  He therefore did not have the time to 
take a stance on issues that divided the national legislature.  Subsequently, he did not 
make enemies within the government.  His efforts to maintain neutrality on issues of 
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concern made him the perfect candidate to lead the Congress.128     
 The duties of the office of President of the Continental Congress were enough to 
weaken the strongest revolutionary.  It was a thoroughly exhausting, constantly thankless 
position that brought with it the burden of a new nation’s survival.  It is understandable 
that Henry Laurens voted against his own nomination and tried to refuse the office when 
it was conferred upon him.129  The path that Laurens had been compelled to take was a 
rocky one and before his term was up he not only redefined his position, he corrected the 
course of government for the United States of America.   
 Perhaps it was the realization of the enormity of the task before him that 
compelled Henry Laurens to vote against his own nomination to succeed John 
Hancock.130  The duties of the President of the Continental Congress were more than one 
person could sufficiently deal with.  Though his scope of authority was undefined, Henry 
Laurens was to serve as the conduit through which the decisions of the Continental 
Congress reached the struggling young nation.        
 In his first letter to the states, President Laurens apprised the governments of the 
United States that despite the removal of the Congress to York, the war was not lost.  In 
fact, a significant victory had been scored during the hasty removal of the government 
from Philadelphia.  In October of 1777, British forces under General John Burgoyne had 
been defeated by American forces under Major General Horatio Gates in the battle of 
Saratoga, New York.  When news of this victory reached the Congress, a day of 
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thanksgiving was proclaimed.  “The arms of the United States of America having been 
blessed in the present campaign with remarkable success,” he wrote, “Congress have 
resolved to recommend that one day, Thursday the 18th December next be set apart and 
observed by all the inhabitants throughout these States for a General Thanksgiving.”131  
The first message contained hope for an American victory and solemn prayers for 
deliverance from the specter of war.   
 Aside from communicating with the individual state governments, Laurens was 
also vested with the responsibility of updating the Commander-in-Chief of the 
Continental Army of the progress of congressional policies.  Almost immediately after 
assuming the chair of the congress, Laurens received letters from General Washington 
complaining of a lack of funds and a severe need of clothing for the Continental Army.132  
The general also informed the new president that it would be beneficial to the American 
cause to have the Marquis de Lafayette in service as a Major General of Continental 
forces with his own command.133  At the same time, Laurens was apprised of the 
conditions of General Burgoyne’s surrender to Major General Horatio Gates.  Lieutenant 
Colonel John Laurens sent a hand written copy of the negotiations and the final 
settlement to his father on November 5, 1777.  General Burgoyne agreed to Gates’ terms 
and his men were allowed to leave the battle site with their arms under the proviso that 
they not serve in North America again.134   
 Laurens wasted no time in responding and immediately reported this important 
                                                          
131  Circular to the Governors, November 1, 1777, Papers.  Chesnutt, 11: 592.   
132  George Washington to HL, November 1, 1777, Papers.  Chesnutt, 12: 5-6.     
133  Ibid, 12: 8-9.   
134  John Laurens to HL, November 5, 1777, Papers.  Chesnutt, 12: 27-28.   
 
 38
military success to the Continental Congress.135  There was little time to enjoy this news, 
however.  On November 11, 1777, General Washington reiterated his requests for more 
money and more clothing for the Continental Army.136  In response to Washington’s 
letter, Laurens informed the general that the Treasury was severely depleted and therefore 
it would take time to send the necessary funds.  Aside from the cost of moving the 
Congress several times and the money it had already expended supplying the army, there 
were other reasons for the near bankrupt status of the Continental Treasury.   
 In a letter to John Lewis Gervais, Laurens commented that the congress had, as a 
matter of protocol, given “sums to these disappointed speculatists who had been induced 
to cross the Atlantic from hearing that there was ’a fine war’ in this side.”  In this, 
Laurens referred to the foreign officers and nobles, most of whom were French, who had 
been enticed by Silas Deane to seek commissions in the Continental Army.137  Congress 
had resolved to pay these French officers enough money to cover their travel expenses 
back to France or to territories within the French sphere of influence.  The resolution of 
the congress agreed to compensate these individuals “according to their respective 
stations.”138   
 Frustrated at not being able to effectively assist General Washington, Laurens 
began to worry about the state of affairs for the new national government.  However, 
referring Washington’s request for additional clothing directly to the Board of War, 
Laurens sought a speedy solution.  When the board determined that the best course of 
action would be to seek out private merchants to supply the army, Laurens immediately 
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sent orders to Boston for that purpose with the approval of Congress.139  This is the first 
instance in which Henry Laurens stepped beyond the limited scope of political authority.     
 Although he had no executive authority, occupying the presidency allowed 
Laurens to “move” Congress towards certain actions.140  Directing the agenda of the 
Congress permitted Laurens to submit the most important requests directly to the 
appropriate boards.  Sidestepping official congressional protocol seemed the best course 
of action, allowing important requests to be evaluated by the appropriate boards.     
 When other military figures pressed congress for funds, President Laurens went 
directly to the chairman of the treasury board and enquired as to the status of the 
continental treasury.  He also advised the members of congress to seek other funding 
sources within their respective states to assist with the pressing financial crisis.141  To 
lessen the financial burden faced by the Congress, it was resolved that all measures be 
employed to secure such items as blankets and shoes.142
 To confront the problem of supplying the Continental Army, Laurens and the 
Congress wrote directly to the individual states to seek out their assistance.  Laurens 
informed the Clothier General of the Continental Army, James Mease, that orders from 
Congress had been sent to Boston authorizing the purchase of shoes and clothing for 
10,000 soldiers.  In this letter, Laurens commented that though the orders of the Congress 
only mentioned Boston as a source of supplies, that Mease should also make such 
arrangements with Salem and Newberry Port.  Laurens further commented that he had 
sent letters to the Massachusetts Assembly outlining his request, as well as the orders of 
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the congress.  Although the orders from the Continental Congress did not include the 
towns of Newberry and Salem, Laurens commented, “I am sure it was so intended.”  
Knowing of several prominent merchants within these towns who supported the cause 
gave the president a marked advantage over some of his congressional colleagues who 
were not in trade.143  Perhaps these additional locations were overlooked by the Board of 
War and by the Congress.  However, it was Laurens who recognized the importance of 
deviating from the exact wording of the congressional dispatch and took the appropriate 
steps.   
 While he was adhering to the dictates of the Congress, Laurens used his own 
methods.  He was not reluctant to express his own sentiments in correspondence as seen 
in many of his letters to the state governments and to General Washington and the 
Marquis de Lafayette.  When James Mease later pressed Laurens for more money to 
purchase additional supplies, Laurens sidestepped the congressional protocol that 
required him to submit this request through the treasury board and went directly to the 
Congress.  The request was immediately taken up at the president’s insistence and passed 
by the congress.144   
 When Congress resolved to seek military supplies through its commissioners in 
Europe, Laurens contributed his own opinions to the debates, speaking not only as a 
delegate but as the president of the Congress.  The resolution of congress only outlined 
the purchase of gun powder and lead from European markets.  However the president felt 
that it would be best to seek out “three or more proper persons, skillful in working lead 
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mines and refining lead ore.”145  Though he did not serve on the Committee for Foreign 
Affairs, he nonetheless added his own sentiments to their original resolution and 
presented his findings to the congress.   
 Henry Laurens, dedicated to the cause of American independence, stepped 
beyond the limited scope of his political authority, making valuable contributions to the 
resolutions of the Continental Congress.  However, the voluminous correspondence that 
was required for his position afforded him little time to rest.  Another example of this 
came shortly after he assumed the presidency.  In November of 1777, Colonel Benjamin 
Flower, Commissary General of Military Stores, informed Laurens of a serious 
deficiency in the procedures of congress in relation to the war effort.  The colonel alerted 
the president that several dozen important commissary positions had not been filled, 
despite his continued insistence.  Laurens immediately went to the floor with these 
concerns.  The resolution providing for these commissions had been passed by the 
congress in September of 1777.  However, due to the confusion that had accompanied the 
evacuation from Philadelphia, no action had been taken.  Bringing the Commissary 
General’s letter directly to the congress, the president urged an immediate response.  The 
commissions were filled and Laurens sent an immediate response to Colonel Flower.146          
 On November 30, 1777, President Laurens wrote to Lieutenant Colonel John 
Laurens that “the last 48 hours, have been almost wholly employed at this table and in 
Congress.”  “In that time,” Laurens continued, “I have had about 7 hours sleep.”  Less 
than one month into his new position, Laurens was overwhelmed.  The information that 
was made available to him began to weigh heavily on his mind.  As the President of 
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Congress, Laurens was privy to reports from all departments of the war.  One report from 
General Washington warned of the possibility of General Howe taking the city of York 
and seizing the entire government.  Although this report was never verified, and proved 
to be idle speculation, such fears existed and gave the president several sleepless nights.147     
 In this same letter, Laurens lamented the deplorable state of the Continental 
Congress and the severe lack of ready funds to supply the army.  After a thorough 
investigation, Laurens discovered that the biggest problem resulted from the many 
commissions promised by Silas Deane to foreign officers during his time in Paris.  It was 
no wonder that the Continental Congress could not keep the army supplied, when it had 
already bestowed “money out by millions to particular persons” to satisfy these 
promises.148  Recognizing that congress could not continue to support the hordes of 
French soldiers who were now entreating congress for their promised commissions, 
Laurens sent letters to the states requesting funds and supplies for the Continental Army 
as a means of lessening the burden faced by the general government.  Laurens also 
entreated the states to find places for these men within their militia units.  Again, not 
wishing to alienate the French and lose the possibility of an alliance with France, Laurens 
sought a means to placate these individuals.149   
 All of these factors led Henry Laurens to worry about the future of America.  His 
strenuous efforts to keep up with the volume of correspondence between the congress and 
the state governments weakened his health and he was stricken with a severe case of gout 
in December of 1777.150  Though he never doubted that the American cause would 
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succeed, he feared the ravages of the winter to come and the state of affairs of the general 
government in York. 
 Another concern that Laurens faced was the rise in profiteering among merchants 
within the United States and the sluggish nature of the individual state governments in 
responding to such actions.  When goods purchased in Massachusetts by the Continental 
Congress through Deputy Clothier General Samuel Otis were not delivered, Laurens and 
the congress took immediate action.151  In a letter to the Massachusetts Assembly, 
Laurens voiced the “inexpressible concern” of the government towards these merchants 
who had refused to accept the credit of the Continental Congress.  Laurens, though 
speaking for the general government, added his own sentiments and passionate 
expression to this letter in an effort to arouse a sense of duty to the cause in the members 
of the assembly.  “If the several governments do not speedily exert their authority to 
effectually suppress such unheard of extortion,” he stated, condemning the merchants 
who did not fulfill their contractual obligations, “it will unquestionably issue, and at no 
very distant period too, in the destruction of the liberties of this continent.”152
 Another important task that Henry Laurens was vested with was maintaining the 
positive relationship between the Continental Congress and the foreign officers in service 
to the United States.  In this, Henry Laurens the diplomat comes into prominence.  The 
most important ally, of course, was France.  Aside from informing General Washington 
and the regional commanders of the Continental Army of the disposition of supplies and 
money, Laurens also sent letters to Lafayette outlining the government’s progress.  To 
ensure the safe arrival of his correspondence, Laurens informed the Marquis that he 
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always sent out six copies of his letters during war, a habit that he suggested that the 
Marquis adopt when communicating with his contacts in France.153
 In a letter dated December 20, 1777, Laurens informed Lafayette that John Adams 
had been appointed one of the American Commissioners to the court of France and asked 
the Marquis to introduce Adams, “to the countenance of your noble friends in France.”  
Laurens realized Adams could make vital political and financial contacts within the 
French nobility so he acted independently of the Continental Congress.154  Relying on his 
friendship with the Marquis helped Laurens to achieve otherwise unattainable ends.     
 Another aspect of his position allowed Laurens to underscore resolutions made by 
the Continental Congress with respect to the individual states.  Though much of what was 
transmitted to the state governments was included in official dispatches, Laurens sent 
personal letters to the leadership of the states pointing out important information in these 
dispatches.  Some of these acts of congress were only briefly discussed in the official 
dispatches, yet were promoted by Laurens as priorities for the consideration of the state 
legislatures.  Most of the resolutions that Laurens underscored as priorities dealt with 
supplies and money for the Continental Army.155
 To say that Laurens was a dedicated public servant does not begin to describe the 
diligence with which he embraced his responsibilities.  Despite the deleterious effect that 
the presidency had on his health, Laurens worked constantly to communicate the desires 
of Congress to the state governments and the commanders of the Continental Army.  
Writing late into the night and at the earliest light of the morning, Laurens stressed the 
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importance of each state’s participation in the American cause.  Despite the pain of his 
affliction Laurens did not wish to miss the appointed meetings of the congress.  He 
therefore resolved to be carried into sessions when walking proved difficult.156    
 What concerned Laurens most was the fact that General Washington’s forces had 
recently entered their winter quarters.  With the ravages of winter, it became increasingly 
necessary to seek out new sources of supplies and clothing for the troops.  “Had proper 
diligence been used,” he wrote in reference to the sluggish nature through which congress 
had originally responded, “those who are now naked and perishing in General 
Washington‘s camp might have all been covered in November.”157  His frustrations 
reached a fevered pitch when winter ravaged the Continental troops encamped at Valley 
Forge, Pennsylvania.  Throughout the country, Continental troops were settling into their 
winter quarters.  From assuming the presidency in November until January of 1778, 
Laurens received dispatches outlining a shocking lack of supplies and money from New 
York, Rhode Island, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina.     
 Writing to Rhode Island Governor Nicholas Cooke, Laurens commented that 
since Congress had made no response to Cooke’s request for provisions for the 
Continental troops in service to his state, that he would “embrace the earliest proper 
opening for bringing the State of Rhode Island into view again.”158  Cooke had asked 
Congress to assist the troops in his state as early as November of 1777.  However, due to 
the fact that the Congress was acting in the capacity of Quartermaster General, Clothier 
General and Commissary General, the government could not effectively respond to 
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Cooke’s request when he had made it.  Laurens confessed that while this excuse was 
unfortunate it in no way represented a “neglect” of Rhode Island’s demands.     
 It was at this time that Laurens began to recognize the subtle development of 
party factions within the Continental Congress.  What distressed him most about this 
issue was the effect that this partisanship had on public policy.  Already concerned that 
the machinations of Silas Deane had contributed to the financial crisis affecting the 
government, Laurens began to despise the political infighting he witnessed in the 
Congress.  Writing to Jonathan Trumbull in January of 1778, Laurens confessed that the 
entire American cause was “on the brink of a precipice.”  The entities necessary for the 
sustaining of the army were, “shattered and distracted,” with the Continental Congress 
pressed into acting as Clothier General, Commissary General, and Quartermaster.  The 
purpose of this letter was to entreat Trumbull, who had acted as Commissary General 
until his resignation in July of 1777, to return to his position.  The failure of his 
replacement to effectively carry out his responsibilities had caused more problems, not 
only for the army but within the Continental Congress.159
 In words appealing to Trumbull’s patriotism, and his previous service to the 
country, Laurens alluded to the thanks of a grateful nation.  Moreover, President Laurens 
acted without the knowledge of the Congress.  He acted because he recognized the 
importance of having a dedicated public servant like Trumbull continue in service to the 
American cause.  Going above the responsibilities vested in him by his position, Laurens 
recognized the considerable void that Trumbull’s absence had caused and acted to 
prevent the appointment of a less qualified individual to take his place.  Trumbull 
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responded that while he was grateful for the president’s comments, his health precluded 
him from returning to his duties.  However, he did make suggestions as to where the 
congress could look to find food supplies for the Continental Army and lauded the 
president for his dedication to the cause.160
 Seeing that the question of a permanent supply line to the Contiental Army would 
not be easily answered, Henry Laurens called the congress into extra sessions in January 
of 1778.  The continual requests from army commanders represented a grave danger to 
the success of the military as it faced a harsh winter and Laurens realized that a solution 
had to be found.161  This was the question that the congress would struggle with 
throughout the remainder of Henry Laurens’ term as president.   
 Despite his strenuous efforts to keep up with the various supply needs of the 
army, Laurens began to fear that the entire enterprise was in danger of fragmenting into 
chaos.  In the midst of the pressing financial constraints facing the government, a serious 
conflict within the Continental Army came to light.  In the early weeks of January several 
letters were forwarded to the president by Lieutenant Colonel John Laurens, who was 
encamped at Valley Forge with General Washington.  These letters contained the 
complaints and pointed accusations of Major General Thomas Conway against 
Washington, alluding to the inability of the general to successfully command the army.  
These letters had originally been sent to Major General Horatio Gates in November of 
1777, but they were forwarded to General Washington through Lieutenant Colonel 
Laurens.  What followed next would nearly rend the fabric of the Continental Army.162
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 In his letter, John Laurens informed President Laurens of the “base insult offered 
to the Commander-in-Chief which will raise your indignation.”  The letter, which was 
obviously never meant to be seen by Washington, called him a weak general who was a 
danger to the success of the army.  Conway even went so far in his letter as to compare 
General Washington to Frederick the Great of Prussia.  The young Laurens severely 
criticized General Conway, even alluding to his possible cowardice during the American 
retreat from Germantown.  Fearing that the Congress was dividing into factions over 
Washington and the continuation of his command, John entreats his father to take an 
active stance against any such divisions.163   
 When the news of this alleged conspiracy reached Laurens, he concealed it from 
the Congress until he could have time to reflect on the situation.  The issue did not fade 
away as time passed.  Protests from other field officers, some of whom were angered at 
the fact that Conway had been promoted to Inspector General above more promising 
generals, were sent to members of congress, the Board of War, and even President 
Laurens.  General Washington himself had already noted that Conway’s attitude toward 
him in dispatches was icy and unbecoming an officer.  Moreover, the reception of 
General Conway at Valley Forge indicated that Washington’s staff officers were forming 
their own opinions on the matter.164  Conway denied making accusations against 
Washington.  Furthermore, a rift developed between General Washington and General 
Gates over the Conway letters which also threatened the command structure of the entire 
Continental Army.165  
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  In a private meeting between General Conway and the president, Conway 
reiterated his claims of innocence.  “General Conway called on me and sat an hour,” 
Laurens wrote to his son on January 25, 1778.  At this meeting, Conway “assured me 
there were no such words in this letter to General Gates as those quoted by the General 
[Washington].”  Concerned over how far the dispute between Washington and Conway 
would go, Laurens confessed that “this indeed may be called a public affair and I am 
afraid will become very public.”  It was the issue of just how public the dispute would 
become that worried the president.  An internal quarrel within the Continental Army 
carried with it the potential for disaster.166  Once more afflicted with an attack of gout, 
Laurens was greatly concerned over this “unhappy dispute subsisting between” General 
Washington and General Conway.  Laurens saw such a conflict as a division that could 
be used by the British to undermine the independence of the thirteen states and fracture 
the tenuous union between them.167
 The possibility of divisions within the Continental Congress over public policy 
disturbed the president greatly.  From his first days as a delegate to the congress, Laurens 
had seen the gradual rise of party factions within the government.  In his letter to 
Commissary General Trumball, the president commented that he had witnessed the 
divisions over the most minor issue of public policy.  “I saw party,” he wrote, “and 
lamented the prospect, every day enlightened me and I soon prognosticated evils which 
we are now laboring under and which must be conquered…”168  To John Laurens, the 
president confessed, “the events which I dreaded and in many instances predicted, are 
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now coming to maturity.”  “I feel for my country,” he continued, “I feel for the thirteen 
infant states.”  Vowing to settle the matter with all deliberate speed and to curtail the 
development of an internal conspiracy against Washington, Laurens concluded “I will 
attend to all their movements and have set my face against every wicked attempt however 
specious.”  Though there was no public discussion over Washington‘s command in the 
congressional records, Laurens noticed the delegates taking sides.  While there was not 
an organized conspiracy to remove Washington, the president was concerned over the 
potential for a public debate.169           
 The president began his own investigation.170   “I have seen the letter,” he wrote to 
Isaac Motte, referring to General Conway‘s statements to General Gates.  “It is true 
General Washington was misinformed,” he reported, “the letter does not contain the 
words which had been reported to him--but ten times worse in every view.”171  Infuriated 
at being deceived by Conway, Laurens confessed that, “I had, before some late 
discoveries, entertained a very high opinion of this General.”   
To further aggravate the situation, Congress had debated appointing Conway as 
Lafayette’s second in command for a proposed expedition into Canada.172  However, 
when Lafayette had learned of General Conway’s comments regarding Washington, he 
responded that he was displeased with the manner in which the Commander-in-Chief had 
been insulted.  In a letter dated January 26, 1778, Lafayette commented that Conway was 
“most disagreeable to me and most prejudicial to the cause.”  Confessing his utmost 
respect and friendship for General Washington, Lafayette condemned Conway as a 
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despicable and wholly contemptible individual who was unworthy of his position in the 
Continental Army.  He furthermore commented that had such an incident occurred in the 
French army, the individual responsible “would be confined immediately and cashiered 
by a court martial.”173  
 What had started as an off-hand comment from one field officer to another 
regarding General Washington, was now a threat to the stability of the army and a matter 
of great concern to the President of the Continental Congress.  Lafayette alluded to the 
possibility that the French officers in service to the United States would return home 
should such an insult to Washington go unanswered.174  It was the possibility of losing the 
alliance with France that frightened Laurens the most.  Despite the presence of American 
representatives in the court of France, little progress had been made on that issue.  “Has 
France done one act of kindness towards us but what has been plumply for the promotion 
of her own interests,” he asked William Livingston.  The official dispatches of Benjamin 
Franklin gave no intimation that the American commissioners were close to a treaty or 
alliance and Laurens was becoming visibly concerned.  The veiled threat of the Marquis 
de Lafayette to withdraw his support did not inspire confidence in the president and only 
served to aggravate an already tense situation.175
 If Lafayette were to leave North America and return to France, it was highly 
likely that the majority of French officers in service to the United States would 
accompany him.  The ranks of the Continental Army would be depleted and, moreover, 
the potential alliance with France would never materialize.176  Lafayette did not want 
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Conway as his second in command and he had made his point clear in subsequent letters 
to Henry Laurens.  On January 31, 1778, rather than merely alluding to the possibility of 
a French withdrawal, the Marquis directly threatened the President of Congress with his 
resignation.  Laurens kept this information hidden from the Continental Congress and 
proceeded with his own investigation.177   
 To further complicate matters, on January 26, 1778, a mysterious letter was 
delivered to the president during a session of the Continental Congress.  Delivered by a 
member of Congress, this letter contained comments about General Washington’s 
command style and the alleged dominance of the government by the military.  Declaring 
that “the hearth was the proper disposition for such records,” Laurens concealed the letter 
from the Congress and read it in private.  Seeking to avoid being drawn further into a 
partisan conflict, the president sent the letter to General Washington for his reflection.  
He asked the general to keep this communication in confidence as the situation was 
already growing out of hand.178   
 Speaking with General Gates regarding the letters from Conway, Laurens worked 
to prevent a further breakdown in the army hierarchy.  In a conversation with General 
Gates, Laurens found him “heartily disposed to a reconciliation” with the Commander-in-
Chief.  “I have no doubt,” he added, “that the same disposition would upon enquiry be 
found on the other side.”  Hoping that his personal conversations with the key players in 
this conspiracy would settle the matter, Laurens operated without the assistance of the 
Continental Congress.  Condemning General Conway’s statements as “the blackest 
hypocrisy,” Laurens obtained from Gates sympathy for Washington and a personal vow 
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to redeem their relationship.179   
 Having settled the dispute between Gates and Washington, Laurens now moved to 
reassure Lafayette that the situation was well under control and that no more attempts to 
impugn the authority of the Commander-in-Chief would prosper.  Indeed, his public 
support of General Washington throughout the Conway dispute worked to prove this 
end.180  Meanwhile, the Marquis was engaged in problems of his own regarding the 
proposed military expedition into Canada.  Facing a severe lack of funds, and no response 
from the Continental Congress on their availability, Lafayette agreed that the best 
solution would be to cancel the expedition.  He had communicated his decision to the 
president in a letter dated February 19, 1778.181  In March of 1778, the Continental 
Congress agreed that the expedition would be futile and it was finally cancelled.182  In 
April of 1778, Thomas Conway expressed his wish to resign his commission as an officer 
in service to the United States.  President Laurens presented the general’s request to the 
congress, and they accepted it without debate.183      
  In a letter to Lafayette, Laurens assured the French noble that he was deserving 
of his own command and that he should communicate with Washington to secure such a 
place for him as his service to the cause demanded.  The president further ordered $6,000 
(Continental currency) out of his own funds to pay the Marquis’ expenses back to Valley 
Forge in compensation for his financial losses during the aborted expedition to Canada.  
In the postscript of his letter to Lafayette, Laurens also commented that General Gates 
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was anxious to find a suitable position for the Marquis within the army.  This letter 
served to reassure the Marquis that the president had successfully dealt with any attempts 
to undermine the authority of General Washington.  It furthermore empowered the 
Marquis by assuring him that his opinions regarding the conduct of the war were valid 
and had been taken into consideration.184  While Laurens entertained his own opinions of 
the French government, he did not wish to lose this most valuable ally.  Indeed, his 
actions over the course of the Conway dispute were partially, if not fully, motivated by a 
desire to maintain peaceful relations with the French government and their most 
significant representative in the United States.  
 When Lafayette requested permission from the Congress to return to France for 
the purpose of furthering diplomatic relations with the French King, Laurens presented 
his esteem and the thanks of Congress for his service.  Laurens also commented that 
Lafayette would be “held by the good people of these states” in high regard and in 
recognition for his services “an elegant sword” was to be commissioned and presented to 
the Marquis by the American representatives in France.185      
 Having successful curtailed any possible conspiracy and, more importantly 
reassured Lafayette that the government was fully behind General Washington, Laurens 
had settled a potentially dangerous political question.  Should Washington be challenged 
in his command, the tenuous alliance between France and the American Confederation 
might die in its infancy.  Furthermore, the fracturing of the Continental Army over an 
interpersonal conflict would have greatly damaged the morale and the legitimacy of the 
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national command structure.  In his efforts to prevent such a break down, Laurens proved 
to be a most capable crisis manager.  He used his personal relationship with Lafayette to 
prevent him from abandoning the war effort.  He exercised his authority outside of 
congress to get to the heart of the matter with the key players in the conspiracy.   
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Chapter Three: Atrophy and the French Alliance 
 
 Less than three months into his presidency, Henry Laurens had successfully 
defended George Washington against an alleged movement to displace him and 
prevented a breakdown in relations between the United States and France.  Laurens 
redefined his scope of authority without the approval or knowledge of Congress in an 
effort to clarify his position.  In the months that followed the Conway dispute, Laurens 
had little respite from the problems caused by the revolution.  Between February and 
May of 1778, as attendance to the Congress waned, Henry Laurens came into public view 
as he pled for the continued support of the individual states.  With ratification of a treaty 
of alliance with France still a pressing concern, Laurens wanted to create a stronger union 
between the thirteen states by arguing the intrinsic dangers of political leaders vacating 
their national responsibilities.  These were the often overlooked internal political 
struggles that accompanied the American Revolution.  
 At the same time he was confronted with the severe lack of funds for the 
Continental Army and the internal dispute between Washington and Conway, Laurens 
noticed the shrinking numbers of representatives in Congress.  “The house has been 
reduced to nine states represented in units that we have been stagnant from a want of 
members,” he wrote to John Lewis Gervais in January of 1778.  This was the state of 
affairs to which the general government had sunk in the months following the evacuation 
of Congress from Philadelphia.  Laurens confessed that had been reduced to idle debate 
for days at a time due to a severe lack of representation from the states.  The political 
affairs of the nation were ignored, a fact that President Laurens lamented repeatedly in 
 
 57
his personal correspondence.186  Moreover, this deficit generated serious problems for the 
government, problems that Laurens and the few remaining members of the Continental 
Congress were forced to contend with on their own.  His balancing of these concerns had 
a continued effect on his personal well being.                 
 In this same letter, Laurens complained of the pitiful state of affairs to which the 
government had been reduced.  Predicting doom and disaster for the general government, 
not to mention the revolution itself, Laurens encouraged Gervais to send South Carolina 
politicians to the Continental Congress.187  Only this action could prevent the government 
from further digressing into a state of chaos in the midst of the war.  It was his hope to 
impress upon the leaders of the individual states the need for such an action.  To 
Governor William Livingston of New Jersey, Laurens commented, “our whole system is 
tottering, and God only knows whether we shall be able to prop it up.”188  Due to the poor 
representation in Congress, the board of war and the various government departments 
responsible for distributing supplies to the army were lax in their responsibilities.  
Laurens now saw to the proper distribution of the necessary supplies, in addition to his 
presidential responsibilities.  The volume of correspondence from the president 
throughout these months indicates his dedication to the task, and demonstrates just how 
serious the situation had become.  In his letter to Governor Livingston, the president 
commented that while the members of Congress continued to debate he had expanded his 
own responsibilities by performing the duties of other officers.189
 “The powers of Congress fall short of compulsive means,” Laurens again wrote to 
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Livingston in January of 1778.  The Continental Congress, while a national assembly, did 
not have the ability to compel the individual states to pursue a course of action.  This was 
the inherent flaw of the American Confederation, in that the national government lacked 
the power that was necessary to enforce its legislation.  In addition, the government now 
lacked members, which represented a serious problem.  “We want of genius for striking 
out new matter,” he continued, “for correcting errors and repressing dangerous 
appearances.”190  To Rhode Island Governor Nicolas Cooke, Laurens commented that 
while the Congress was working on settling the issue of supplies and funds for the army, 
the debates “fall heavily upon a very few members, from 17 to 21 who faithfully attend 
their duty.”  Some of the representatives who attended could not act because their 
individual state constitutions required a minimum of their delegations to be present.  
Several times, Laurens alludes to the frustration of the Congress over members who 
attended the regular meetings but could not legally participate.  Noting the seriousness of 
the army’s plight, the president informed Governor Cooke that “these circumstances” 
were the root cause of the sluggish nature of the general government and not an example 
of purposeful neglect by Congress of national concerns.191  However, “the unaccountable 
deficiencies” in the government were beginning to weigh heavily on President Laurens’ 
mind.  Praising those few members who continued to attend the meetings of Congress, 
Laurens assured the leadership of the several states that the general government was not 
slipping towards chaos.  Even so, he personally feared such an occurrence.192    
 It was the lack of congressional delegates, compounded with the desperate need 
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of supplies for the army, that motivated Henry Laurens to call Congress into extra 
sessions beginning in January of 1778.  To satisfy the pressing needs of the Continental 
Army, Laurens realized those few members present needed to perform the duties of the 
entire government.  The “urgent and important business, which requires immediate 
dispatch” that the president spoke of in his letter to the delegates outlined the state of 
affairs for the government during this time.  Laurens recognized the need for the 
Congress to compensate for the gradual ebbing of its membership by dedicating more 
hours to the plight of the nation.  The scant few remaining delegates, ranging from 17 to 
21, and even less at times, whole heartedly agreed.193  “There are presently 21 members 
on the floor,” he wrote to New York Governor George Clinton in January of 1778.  Of 
these 21 delegates, Laurens spoke highly of their devotion to the cause.  However, “in 
order to guard against the dispersion of the army,“ he wrote, Congress was forced to act 
as “Quartermaster General, Clothier General, Commissary General.”  Laurens realized 
that this effort could not be maintained indefinitely.  Adding his own sentiments to the 
letter, Laurens requested that Governor Clinton send “more ample representation from 
the State of New York” to fill the void within the Continental Congress.  In the winter of 
1778, New York was represented by only one delegate, William Duer.  The rest of that 
state’s six member delegation had left the capital for public pursuits within New York 
and throughout the United States.  Consequently, New York could contribute little to the 
sessions of Congress until it had reached its required quorum.  Laurens made this fact 
clear in his letter to the governor.194
 Laurens reiterated this same request to the government of South Carolina on 
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January 26, 1778.  Even his home state was a contributing factor to this crisis of 
representation.  Poor representation endangered the ability of the Continental Congress to 
effectively govern the thirteen states.  “I hope the states will be roused,” Laurens wrote, 
“[to] fill their representations in Congress with wise and spirited men.”  The success of 
the revolution and the independence of the thirteen colonies depended on this.  “If the 
states do not exert themselves,” the president commented, “their Stewards will complete 
their ruin and disgrace.”195  Laurens saw the lack of representation as a contributing factor 
to the destruction of the tenuous union of states.  Not only could the union suffer from 
this atrophy, but the very success of the American Revolution.     
 Laurens realized that the deficiencies within the Congress were affecting every 
aspect of the war effort.  When the president moved to appoint Brigadier Generals within 
the state of South Carolina, he was vexed to find that once again there were not enough 
members in attendance to discuss the issue.  When he pressed the resolution before those 
members present, Laurens was informed that “there was no body on the floor to take up 
and improve the suggestions from the chair.”196  Angered, the president retired to his 
study and wrote a frustrated letter to Isaac Motte.  “We deserve the evil of this delay,” he 
wrote, “for our shameful and unpardonable delay of filing up our delegacy with sensible 
vigilant faithful citizens.”197        
 Thinking of the American image in the courts of Europe, most especially in the 
court of France, Laurens argued that the revolutionary movement could become a farce.  
To further compound his anguish, Laurens was aware that certain individuals were 
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profiting from the war effort and had set aside funds for themselves while the Continental 
Army suffered for want of provisions and funds in its winter camp.  “Knaves and fools 
are building enormous estates,” he said of the vast corruption among state officials and 
private individuals who were profiting from the war effort, “sapping the foundations of 
liberty, virtue, and their country.”  To Laurens, these individuals were as greedy as the 
British Parliament.  They were abusing the trust given to them by the American 
government and providing for their greed.198  Realizing the danger of such profiteering, 
Laurens went to Congress to counteract those responsible.  
 Reporting this news directly to the Congress, Laurens encouraged the creation of 
the office of Auditor of Army Accounts, to determine where public money was being 
used wisely.  Recognizing the dire need for such a position, Laurens persuaded Congress 
to empower the public auditors with the ability to prosecute any individual responsible 
for the misuse of government funds to the fullest extent of the law.  This was the 
president’s most stringent effort to unravel the web of corruption that he noticed 
spreading throughout the young nation.  Laurens further added that any individual guilty 
of subversion against the United States should be dealt with promptly.  The resolution 
was discussed and approved by the Continental Congress in February of 1778.  Though 
Congress suffered from a lack of membership, those delegates present were rallied by 
Laurens to take decisive action.  Not only did Laurens publicly advocate this position, but 
he helped to draft the document that created it.199
 As a result of the creation of this office, several individuals who had 
misappropriated public funds were brought to justice.  Laurens presented this information 
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to the Congress and voted in favor of a full investigation.  At one point, an investigation 
into the actions of the various administrators of the Commissary departments seemed to 
unmask a high-ranking officer responsible for using public money for his own personal 
gain.  When Colonel Benjamin Flower was accused by his deputy, Cornelius Sweers, of 
such malfeasance of office, the Congress ordered his immediate arrest.200  Though it 
pained him to see such a dedicated soldier as Colonel Flower named in this investigation, 
Laurens nonetheless approved of the action.  His previous experiences with corruption 
under the royal government in South Carolina firmed his resolve.  Entrusting Colonel 
Flower to the guardianship of Major General Benedict Arnold, the Congress ordered a 
further investigation into Sweers’ accusations.201  When it was determined that Colonel 
Flower had nothing to do with the misappropriation of public money, and in fact 
Cornelius Sweers was the responsible party, all charges against the colonel were dropped 
and his rank and privileges restored.202          
 While Colonel Flower was innocent of any wrongdoing, corruption and general 
dissention certainly existed within the departments of the government.203  With the 
approval of Congress, Laurens began a long term correspondence with the leadership of 
the thirteen states to remind state executives of the importance of national unity and 
adequate representation in Congress.  Using the examples of profiteering, Laurens hoped 
to expose the dangers of a government unable to manage its own affairs.  Throughout 
February and March of 1778, the president sent passionately worded reminders to South 
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Carolina, Pennsylvania, Delaware, and New York.204  This was the only means to impress 
upon state leaders the importance of having full delegations in attendance.  While the 
orders had come from the Congress, the words and thoughts were his own.  Laurens 
realized the enormity of his task and the importance of a swift response from the states. 
 To further compound his anguish over the lack of proper representation with the 
Congress, Laurens was forced to chide one of his colleagues for neglecting his 
responsibilities.  When North Carolina Delegate Thomas Burke refused to attend a 
session of the Continental Congress in April of 1778, Laurens sent a messenger from the 
meeting room to Burke’s residence in York.  Burke refused to appear before the Congress 
and forced a delay in the day’s business.  Claiming that only his home state of North 
Carolina had the authority to command his attendance at congressional meetings, Burke 
ignored the order of Congress.  This response infuriated the president, who dispatched the 
messenger again to Burke’s residence.  Laurens and the remaining delegates determined 
that an official sanction would be the best course of action.  Burke was compelled to 
appear before the Congress on April 24, 1778 and answer for his act of defiance.205   
 The first congressional inquiry into the actions of one of its own members began 
and ended on that day.  After restating his claim that the Congress did not have the 
authority to compel him to attend its meetings, Burke claimed that he had received no 
such mandate from the North Carolina Assembly empowering him to return.206  When the 
Congress voted on whether or not to expel Burke, Laurens voted against such an action as 
detrimental to the general government.  The Congress had already lost a significant 
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portion of its membership and until North Carolina appointed a new delegate, Burke was 
needed.207  Subsequently, the Continental Congress ordered the full record of the 
proceedings concerning Thomas Burke to be sent to the North Carolina Assembly.208  
Henry Laurens wrote an attachment to the official message sent by the assembly from 
York.  “I am persuaded it is not the desire of Congress,” he wrote to North Carolina 
Governor Richard Caswell, “to take advantage of Mr. Burke, nor hurt his character by 
impressions made in his absence on the minds of his fellow citizens…”  His intention in 
calling Burke before the Congress and supporting the motion to censure him was due to 
the need for every available delegate to perform their duly appointed task.  In this letter, 
Laurens maintained that it was not the result of individual bias or any political fracturing 
within the general government that had brought about this course of action.  It was simply 
a matter of maintaining a quorum.209       
 Delegate Burke believed his term in the Continental Congress was over, in 
accordance with the constitution of the state of North Carolina.  In his response to 
Laurens’ request that he present himself to the body immediately, Burke informed the 
president that he had received no orders from North Carolina empowering him to 
continue to speak for that government.  He therefore resolved to quit the house and await 
further instructions from his home assembly.210  While this was the proper thing to do 
given the protocol of the day, it aggravated an already serious problem.  However, 
President Laurens was concerned over the disturbing inability of the Congress to function 
without members.  Burke was singled out because he was physically in York, but had 
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refused to return to the floor as requested.211  As Laurens had commented to Samuel 
Adams, “Able men are exceedingly necessary in Congress at this time.”212   
 “All the states have been exceedingly remiss in their respective representations in 
Congress,” the president wrote to Jacob Zahn in April of 1778.  “A remiss,” he added, 
“which will cost them millions of dollars, and which had one time exposed our cause to 
the most imminent danger.”213  Laurens was certain that if the thirteen states were to work 
together, militarily as well as politically, that they could drive the British from North 
America.214  Obviously, the president realized that unity was just as important to the 
success of the cause as a military alliance with France.  This was what had motivated 
Laurens in his tireless efforts throughout the winter months of 1777 and 1778.  Slowly, 
the individual states responded to the president’s repeated requests for delegates.  
Throughout the months of April, May, and June of 1778, the states sent new 
representatives to fill the vacancies within the Continental Congress.  Though the 
president continued to express his concern over inadequate representation, his efforts 
over the previous months were beginning to bear fruit.215   
 Having weathered a particularly difficult political quagmire regarding the disputes 
between Washington, Gates, and Conway, the Congress was engaged in another serious 
issue that concerned the president.  The military and commercial alliance with the 
government of France played heavily into Henry Laurens’ actions while President of the 
Continental Congress.  Throughout his final months in office, Laurens added the final 
touches to the alliance and welcomed America’s first official diplomatic representative 
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from another country.           
 Recognition by a powerful European nation such as France was essential to 
victory in the American Revolution.  Laurens was aware of this even before he began his 
term as president, and he endeavored to achieve the much desired alliance between 
France and the United States.  During the Conway incident and Laurens’ struggle with 
congressional atrophy, important steps were taken toward an official alliance with the 
French government.  However, just as the Congress was about to discuss the wording of 
the alliance, another serious concern came to light.   
 The main issue facing Henry Laurens and the adoption of a treaty of alliance 
between France and the United States concerned the possibility of peace overtures from 
the British government.  To accept a military and commercial alliance with the French 
could close the door on any possible reconciliation between Great Britain and her former 
colonies.  As President of Congress, Laurens had received information that General Sir 
William Howe had been instructed to make a settlement with the American government 
in November of 1777.  This news had been delivered to the president through another 
member of the Congress and presented to the general assembly.  A Pennsylvania 
merchant named John Brown claimed to have escaped occupied Philadelphia with “a 
verbal message to Congress from General Howe.”  Since the message was delivered 
orally through an intermediary Congress refused to consider it.  “Such conduct 
administers just grounds of suspicion,” the Congress resolved, “that he is employed by 
the enemy for purposes inimical to these states.”216  Laurens himself found this news to be 
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“mysterious” and did not consider such an offer to carry any serious weight.217  
Accordingly, the Congress ordered Brown to be arrested and held by the government of 
Pennsylvania.218   
 The American government, and President Laurens, considered any statements 
sent through intermediaries regarding the continuation of the war to be specious.  “The 
[British] administration was greatly shocked,” Laurens commented to the Marquis de 
Lafayette, “by the account of Mr. Burgoyne’s surrender, but it does not appear from any 
hints dropped on their part that they were disposed to terminate their dispute with 
America.”219  “There possibly will be attempts to treat for peace,” he continued, “but I do 
not expect anything substantial to follow, but blows…”220  In this letter, the president 
warned the Marquis that the “monied people of England” were becoming alarmed at the 
length of the conflict and had begun to throw their support into the British effort.  If this 
trend were to run unabated, Laurens argued, the future of the revolution would be in 
greater jeopardy.221   
 The president urged Lafayette to be an advocate for the American cause with his 
French peers.  The fact that Laurens had urged Lafayette to return to Valley Forge to 
work with Washington after the cancellation of his military expedition into Canada 
demonstrated his concern to keep the Frenchman true to the cause.222
 When news arrived of a treaty of alliance between the United States and France, 
all that Laurens had worked so hard for seemed to pay off.  However, the acceptance of 
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that treaty while considering peace overtures from the British government was a 
hindrance to an effective alliance.  Laurens did not trust the British, and neither did many 
within the government.  In his letters to Lafayette, the president warned of the misleading 
nature of England’s overtures.  From May to July of 1778, Laurens balanced overtures 
from British commissioners and the French alliance he had fought so hard to achieve. 
 Henry Laurens wanted peace with Great Britain but he wanted it to be on 
“honorable terms,” meaning the full recognition of American independence.223  The 
stunning American victory over the forces of General Burgoyne at Saratoga led the 
British government to reconsider its position on America.  To add further concern, news 
that the American government was close to a treaty of alliance with France forced Prime 
Minister Lord Frederick North to reconsider his position in December of 1777.  In a 
speech before Parliament, Lord North offered the United States a repeal of all taxes and 
acts that had caused the Americans to rebel against that crown.224  He further promised 
the states freedom to elect their own governors and civil administrators, as well as the 
power to determine their own political futures.  North even promised to recognize the 
legitimacy of the Continental Congress as a governing body.  This decision was passed 
through the Parliament at the same time the treaty of alliance with France was being 
signed by American plenipotentiaries in Paris.225  While this news was what Henry 
Laurens had always wanted, he viewed the Prime Minister’s decision with skepticism.  
“Admitting this suspicion to be grounded in experience,” Laurens wrote in April of 1778, 
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“we ought to be ready and early with a formidable army in the field.”226           
  The Marquis de Lafayette had warned Laurens that Lord North had no intention 
of allowing America to be free of British rule.  Rather, the Marquis surmised that North’s 
attempt at reconciliation was an effort to further divide the government.227  Thinking the 
peace overtures to be a ploy to destroy the union, Laurens advocated a unified, well 
prepared military for the coming campaign season.  Regarding the peace proposals from 
Lord North, the president concluded that Britain’s overtures were meant to confuse the 
Congress while the new British commander, Sir Henry Clinton, prepared to break the 
back of the Continental Army.  The movements of General Clinton greatly concerned the 
board of war, General Washington, and President Laurens.228   
 France and England raced to present their case to the Americans.  Great Britain 
wanted to prevent the Continental Congress from approving a treaty between the United 
States and France.  A commission headed by the Earl of Carlisle was appointed in 
February of 1778 and sent to the United States.  This commission was empowered to treat 
with the Continental Congress and reach a settlement regarding the conflict.229  At the 
same time, the treaty with France was on its way to York for approval.  “If war is 
declared between France and England,” Laurens confessed, “the British troops may be 
wanted for defending their islands.”  In that case, he argued, the military situation in 
America would improve for the states.  The intrinsic benefit of the French alliance, 
according to Laurens, would be to force Britain to defend the isles.  Personally, the 
thought of continued warfare concerned the president greatly.  Having witnessed first 
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hand the dangers of such conflicts, Laurens was in no way eager to see England ravaged 
by invasion.230
 On January 13, 1778, the treaty of Amity and Commerce was signed in Paris 
between the United States and France.  The Treaty of Alliance and an additional 
document, known as the Act Separate and Secret, was signed in Paris on February 6, 
1778.  These documents guaranteed military assistance to the United States in her war 
with Great Britain and allowed for the continuation of friendly relations between the 
United States and the government of France.  In the preamble, King Louis XVI promised 
to recognize the United States as a favored nation.  The treaties finally arrived at York on 
May 2, 1778 and the Continental Congress immediately considered them.231  With regard 
to the promises made by the French and the stipulations of the treaties, Laurens 
commented “’tis very well.”232      
 While Congress began considering the treaties from Paris, the British peace 
commission arrived in the city of Philadelphia in April of 1778.  General Sir Henry 
Clinton had ordered the evacuation of the city.  The British military was engaged in a 
general withdrawal at the same time the peace commissioners arrived to begin their 
meetings with the American government.233  “Poor old England,” Laurens wrote in May 
of 1778, “she is said to be in great distress and I believe it.”234   
 With the president encouraging the adoption of the treaties, the Continental 
Congress quickly ratified the alliance on May 4, 1778.235  A great weight had been lifted 
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from the shoulders of Henry Laurens.  With recognition of America as an independent 
nation by the French government came military and financial assistance, plus the promise 
of equal assistance from nations like Spain and Prussia.  Regarding the arrival of the 
British peace commission, Laurens felt that news of a treaty with France would “oblige 
them to shape a new course.”  Writing to General Washington in May of 1778, the 
president stated that “the people in general had very sensibly felt the weight of the war, 
were ardently desirous of peace and anxious lest Congress should reject the intended 
propositions.”  Having received news from several individuals with whom he had dealt in 
the mercantile industry, Laurens recognized a distinct change in the perception of the 
business elite of England regarding the war.  Though not representing the sentiments of 
the general populace, these individuals were growing concerned.236   
 However, Laurens also realized that the war would not end quickly.  “Britain will 
not be hummed by a stroke of policy,” he wrote to Baron von Steuben, “…a powerful 
army in our own fields may, should I say, will, be the only means of securing an 
honorable peace.”237  The die had been cast and the president realized that there would be 
no turning back; not for the United States and most definitely not for Great Britain.   
 While Laurens worked to publicize the alliance between the United States and 
France he also sought to conceal the news of the British peace commission.  He even 
encouraged Congress not to appoint a delegation to meet with the British commission, as 
individuals could not properly represent the interests of the entire government and that 
British delegates could no doubt use that to their advantage.238  Realizing the dangers of 
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acknowledging the British peace overtures, Laurens and the rest of the Congress stressed 
the importance of the French alliance over any offers made by Great Britain.  Had these 
offers been made at the start of hostilities, it is possible that the American government 
would have been more receptive.  It was too late now, especially for Henry Laurens.239                            
 The business of government continued as Laurens prepared to receive the official 
representative from France.  In the meantime, Benjamin Franklin had been officially 
presented to the court of King Louis XVI and accorded all the honors of a formal 
ambassador.  The official exchange of representatives gave the assent to the recognition 
of the United States as a sovereign nation by her first military ally.  At this point, Laurens 
resolved that any agreement reached between the United States and Great Britain would 
occur only when the latter recognized the sovereign status of the United States.  In his 
congressional role, Laurens favored a stern resistance to any attempts at negotiation that 
did not recognize these principals.  The door of reconciliation that the president had once 
referred to had been closed.  It was now essential for the belligerents to treat one another 
as enemies.  Great Britain would now have to reach a settlement with citizens of a new 
nation and not subjects engaged in a rebellion.240
 “There may be an arduous work to perform,” Laurens wrote regarding the 
potential for disaster should France and her allies not engage England, “I perceive a long 
train of direful consequences to America.”241  While he waited to hear from the British 
peace commission, now settling in Philadelphia, Laurens dedicated his efforts to 
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reforming the Continental Army and preparing for the next stage of the conflict.242  
Maintaining his allegiance to the French alliance also benefited Laurens in unexpected 
ways.  Though he recognized the importance of commercial and military treaties with 
other European nations, his main concern was securing the treaty with France.  As a 
result of the machinations of Commissioners Silas Deane, John Adams and Benjamin 
Franklin, Congress now had the potential to negotiate treaties with Holland, Denmark, 
Sweden, and possibly Russia.243
 In response to General Sir Henry Clinton’s withdrawal from Philadelphia and his 
repeated insistence on a meeting with Congress to discuss an end to the hostilities, 
Laurens remained firm.  “Be assured sir,” he argued, “when the King of Great Britain 
shall be seriously disposed to put an end to the unprovoked and cruel war waged against 
the United States, Congress will readily attend to such terms of peace.”244  The fact that 
Clinton had decided to abandon Philadelphia and remove his forces from the vicinity 
concerned the president greatly.  “The idea of the enemy’s intended abandonment of 
Philadelphia, pervades every mind,” he wrote to John Laurens, “I am very certain our 
cause suffers greatly from the general belief of an event being at hand.”  The event that 
the president feared concerned the unseen movements of Clinton’s forces once they had 
withdrawn from Philadelphia.  General Washington’s army was still not up to full 
strength and as yet no news had been heard from France regarding a military action 
against Great Britain.245   
 At the height of this concern, the president received official notification from the 
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British peace commission regarding their offers to the government of the United States.  
Consisting of Frederick, Earl of Carlisle, George Johnston, and William Eden, this 
commission offered all the privileges authorized by Lord North and the Parliament.  
However, the commissioners did not recognize the independent status of the United 
States.246  The commission observed that America was under “the insidious interposition 
of a power, which has from the first settlement of these colonies been actuated with 
enmity to both of us.”247     
 In response to this letter, Laurens reminded the commissioners that the decision to 
end the war was in the hands of the British.  “You are undoubtedly acquainted with the 
only terms upon which Congress can treat,” he wrote to George Johnstone.  “Permit me 
to add,” he continued, “the true interest of Great Britain in the present advance of the 
contest will be found in confirming our independence.”  Plainly stating the case, the 
president concluded his letter with a firm reminder that no communications from the 
British government would be considered unless the independent status of the United 
States were fully recognized.  This right of sovereignty included the right to conduct 
peace negotiations on an equal footing with Great Britain and to negotiate treaties with 
allies.248
 When another letter from the British peace commission arrived in June of 1778, 
the president immediately put it forward for the consideration of Congress.  They 
resolved that since the letter contained defamatory statements about France, the 
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commissioners were not serious in their diplomatic efforts.249  America was moving away 
from Great Britain, to secure an independent future for itself.  By refusing to negotiate 
with the peace commissioners, Laurens was advocating the official national policy of the 
United States.  Though the commission seemed to be offering a great deal, it had not 
recognized the distinct national entity that had emerged in North America.  Henry 
Laurens had, and although not originally a proponent of independence he altered his 
views.  A resolution by Congress, signed by President Laurens, informed the British 
commission that the states will “be ready to enter upon the consideration of a Treaty of 
Peace and Commerce, not inconsistent with Treaties already subsisting, when the King of 
Great Britain shall demonstrate a sincere disposition for that purpose.”  The British 
commission had erred when they supposed “the people of these states to be subjects of 
the crown of Great Britain,” rather than citizens of a free nation.250    
 The Congress opposed meeting the representatives of Great Britain.  The failure 
to recognize American independence was a vital obstruction to the peace process.  
Laurens advocated a firm stance against the peace commissioners in light of the treaty 
with France and the potential for absolute victory.  Had the Continental Congress 
accepted the terms of the British peace commission they would meet on an equal footing.  
The commissioners addressed the Congress as the governing body of the United States, 
but only as a provincial assembly whose authority was derived from the King of Great 
Britain.  Outraged at the disparaging remarks made by the peace commission towards the 
government of France, Laurens remarked that while the commission had offered nominal 
self-determination to the United States, they had given no intimation of American 
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sovereignty.  “If all the fine things now offered had been tendered some time ago,” 
Laurens wrote to General Horatio Gates, “there can be no doubt but that the people of 
America would joyfully have embraced the proposition.”  Now, however, “what answer 
can be given but that which was rendered to foolish virgins--’the door is shut.’”251
 America’s destiny was now in the hands of the French, or at least for the moment 
it was dependent on the assistance of the French government.  Henry Laurens was well 
aware of the importance of a commercial and military alliance with France.  Having 
fought for it throughout his presidency, the fulfillment of that desire did not cause him to 
become lax in his duty to the nation.  As President of Congress, Laurens realized the 
importance of balancing his personal feelings with the will of the government.  While he 
did not support the overtures of the British peace commission, he did not agree with 
congressional policy regarding any correspondence from the commission.  In an effort to 
determine the legitimacy of the commissions proposals, and perhaps to determine what 
inducement were offered to members, Congress resolved to make public all letters from 
the British peace commission to its members.  Henry Laurens objected to this on the 
principal that those letters “were not intended for the public eye.”252
 It was the issue of public perception that concerned the president the most during 
this time.  Congress was considering the Articles of Confederation for several months.  
Also, with the evacuation of Philadelphia, Laurens was uncertain of the movements of 
the British army in North America.253  However, with the British withdrawal from 
Philadelphia, the Continental Congress was able to return to its former home.  “Congress 
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will adjourn this morning to Philadelphia,” Laurens wrote to Rawlins Lowndes, “I have 
many things to day and to hear in a short space of time.”254
 The American victory over the British at Monmouth, New Jersey, in June of 1778 
afforded Laurens the opportunity to celebrate a fortunate turn of luck for the United 
States.  As he settled into his new quarters in Philadelphia, Laurens was able to reflect on 
the changing situation for the United States.  This victory was another cause for 
celebration, the deliverance of Washington and a significant portion of his army from 
what Laurens had called a “snare” coincided with the news of the much coveted French 
alliance.  The efforts of the British peace commission to dissuade Laurens and Congress 
from allying with France had failed.  “I rejoice at the late happy event,” the president 
wrote to John Laurens.255  Informing Congress of the happy news, Laurens expressed his 
gratitude to General Washington and the army.256  Congress subsequently resolved to 
thank Washington “for his distinguished exertions in forming the order of battle” in this 
significant victory.257   
 With France firmly secured as an ally, Laurens confronted the British peace 
commission with a renewed resolve.  He successfully balanced the offers of the British 
representatives with the will of Congress and enacted the alliance that he had fought so 
hard to attain.  Claiming the promises made by the British commission had come too late 
to be considered valid, Laurens was able to firm up the resolve of his congressional 
colleagues.  He had reached a stage in his own ideological evolution where he could 
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dismiss such overtures and concentrate his energies on stimulating America’s new 
relationship with France. 
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Chapter Four: Foreign and Domestic Affairs 
 
 Henry Laurens had already established himself as a dedicated advocate for the 
American cause well before he assumed the presidency of Congress in November of 
1777.  Through his efforts to entreat the states to adhere to the resolutions of the 
Continental Congress, Laurens performed an essential diplomatic service to the nation.  
This much is evident in the correspondence with the leaders of the individual state 
governments throughout his presidency.  He was also vested with the responsibility of 
maintaining the cordial relationship between the United States and France.  For this to 
succeed, military as well as diplomatic cooperation between the two nations was 
required.  Henry Laurens was the conduit through which this cooperation would travel.  
However, as he would soon discover, maintaining the alliance with France was far more 
difficult than achieving it.     
 In the winter of 1778, Laurens confronted a set of conflicts that resulted from the 
much coveted alliance with France.  With the resources of the national government 
already taxed to the limit, Laurens was faced with renewed proposals from America’s 
ally to undertake costly expeditions into British controlled territory in East Florida and 
Canada.  He faced these challenges with a mixture of determination to maintain the 
alliance and a firm resolve not to allow America’s concerns to be rendered secondary to 
those of the powers of Europe.  The remaining months of his presidency found Laurens 
still arguing against the British peace commission while encouraging the states to 
cooperate with the wishes of the Continental Congress.       
 The American Confederation as it existed in 1778 did not give the federal 
government the broad powers that the government has at present.  This was an evolution 
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that came only after the flaws in the confederation had been scrutinized.  While the 
Continental Congress was a national legislature, it did not have the power to govern the 
states.  Its main purpose was to create and sustain a common defense against the military 
power of Great Britain.  At this time, the United States was a collective union of 
sovereign political entities.  As a result of that belief, Henry Laurens had to impress upon 
the states the need to cooperate with Congress. 
 Laurens could not simply order the government of New York or his home state of 
South Carolina to adhere to the wishes of Congress.  Moreover, the Congress lacked the 
necessary powers to enforce its legislation without the assent of the individual states.  
However, as a mediator, the president was able to persuade the states to take actions in 
accordance with the will of the general government.  Laurens excelled at the often vexing 
art of inter-state diplomatic relations, especially when the greater purpose of the nation’s 
survival was at stake.   
 When the state delegates failed to appear at session of the Congress, Laurens had 
appealed to the individual state leaders.  Not only did he warn of the fall of the entire 
American Confederation, but of the more immediate threat to their homes, should the 
British prevail.  How could a state not send its delegates to Congress when that state’s 
own interests were at stake.  He even chastised his own state for not sending a full 
delegation to Congress.258  When rampant profiteering among the merchants of 
Massachusetts was revealed, the president appealed to the Massachusetts Assembly, 
appealing to their sense of responsibility.  He asked Massachusetts to enact legislation 
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that would make it illegal to profiteer from the war effort.259
 In an effort to curtail the financial crisis that had brought the Continental Army to 
its knees, the Congress had agreed on a tax for the individual states.  This tax, which 
would help with the massive financial burden faced by the Congress, was meant to raise 
$5 million over a year’s time.  In November of 1777, Congress debated the issue and 
after much revision the resolution was passed on November 22, 1777.260  The records of 
the Continental Congress credit Henry Laurens with a significant portion revising much 
of the wording of the tax resolution.  Laurens altered the original document to make it 
sound less like a tax and more like a request for additional funding, with the promise to 
provide suitable recompense to the states over time.  His explanation to the individual 
states stressed the importance of raising this money to provide clothing and supplies to 
the Continental Army during its winter camp at Valley Forge.261      
 From his first glimpse at the workings of the national assembly, Laurens realized 
that if America were to endure, the states would have to act like a nation and cooperate 
on the issues that were important to the whole.  A plan of union was the key 
steppingstone for the building of that nation.  When the Congress began considering the 
Articles of Confederation during his first weeks as a delegate, Laurens became vexed at 
just how difficult the process had become.  “I think I have been instrumental in averting 
two pernicious schemes,” he wrote in September of 1777 regarding the debates over the 
issues of taxation and the proportion of a state’s representation in Congress.262  Shortly 
before the evacuation of Congress from Philadelphia in 1777, Laurens noted that despite 
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the crisis atmosphere, the delegates continued to debate every word of the proposed 
articles.  “Fright,” he commented, “works lunacy.”  Laurens noticed that despite the crisis 
atmosphere of the moment the debates still continued.263   
 When Congress began to discuss a system for taxing the individual states as a 
means of gaining additional revenue, Laurens commented that while “two days have been 
amused in conning it, some sensible things have been said, and as much nonsense as ever 
I heard in so short a space.”  Despite all of his concern over the confusion caused by the 
intense debate among the members of Congress, Laurens advocated a compromise over a 
stalemate.  As always with the debates of Congress, Laurens sought to avoid becoming 
involved in sectional disputes.  His intense dislike for factions motivated his efforts to 
play the part of mediator.  Although at times he did take sides on an issue, it was only 
after serious consideration of the facts.264  The adoption of the Articles of Confederation 
represented a great leap forward in the process of building an independent nation.  As 
Laurens had noted during the debates over the articles, the ratification process required its 
own special skill to convince the states to accept the final document.265   
 Adopted by the Continental Congress in November of 1777, the Articles of 
Confederation were sent to the individual states for their consideration.266  “These 
papers,” Laurens wrote, “so expressive of the meaning and good views of Congress 
require no attempt to a more minute detail of their several contents.”  It was Laurens’ 
hope that the articles would be quickly reviewed and approved by the individual states.267  
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However, Laurens did understand the necessity of a continual review of the articles, due 
to the hasty nature in which they had been approved.  The building of a nation was not a 
feat that could not be accomplished in the period of a few months, especially in the midst 
of a war for that nation’s survival.  While he commented that the articles were not a 
perfect plan, he wanted them ratified by the states.  Discussion and revision could follow, 
if necessary.  He was almost certain that they would need to be revised once the military 
crisis had concluded.268   
 Between March and July of 1778, various amendments and substitutions to the 
articles were proposed by the individual state delegations.  Congress continued to revise 
and debate the Articles of Confederation throughout Laurens’ term as president.269  When 
the final copy of the articles had been approved by the Continental Congress in June of 
1778, Laurens hoped to have it signed by the end of the month.  However, due to a series 
of printing mistakes, the document could not be signed before Congress left York and 
returned to Philadelphia.  When Congress reconvened in Philadelphia in July of 1778, the 
Articles of Confederation were three states short of being duly ratified.  The three states 
which had not approved of the articles were Delaware, Maryland, and New Jersey.  North 
Carolina and Georgia had approved, but their delegations were not present at this meeting 
of Congress and therefore could not give their assent.270  “Congress intent upon the 
present and future security of these United States has never ceased to consider a 
Confederacy as the great principal of union,” Laurens wrote to the leaders of Delaware, 
Maryland, and New Jersey.  He urged the leadership of these states to consider the future 
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security of the nation over any semantic disputes that might arise from the articles.271  The 
Articles of Confederation were not finally ratified by the Continental Congress until 
March of 1781, after years of debate over the land boundaries of the states.272                                 
 While Laurens was often perplexed by the divergent natures of the individual 
state governments, especially considering the importance of unity at a time of crisis, he 
proved himself to be adept at rallying them to the cause.  He successfully balanced the 
interests of the individual states with the concerns of the national government.  He was 
able to provide firm guidance without actually possessing the power to compel the states 
to pursue a course of action.   
 Laurens was also quite adept at maintaining friendly personal relationships with 
powerful European nobles, such as the young Marquis de Lafayette.  The alliance with 
France would not have materialized had Lafayette lost faith in Henry Laurens and his 
abilities to bring reason and firm judgment to the government, particularly during the 
Conway dispute.  Furthermore, had Laurens not exerted every effort to placate the young 
Marquis regarding the alleged conspiracy against General Washington and Lafayette’s 
failed mission into Canada, he would never have gained the young Frenchman’s trust.  
While the Conway-Washington dispute is one of the few instances where Laurens 
demonstrates partisan sentiments, his actions were based not only on his feelings for 
Washington, but out of concern for the stability of the Continental Army and the success 
of the French alliance.   
 It was after the military and commercial alliance with France had been duly 
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ratified by the American Congress that Laurens expanded his diplomatic role.  As 
attaining this alliance was essential to the success of the American Revolution, 
maintaining that alliance was equally important.  Before the ink had dried on the official 
documents that certified the alliance, the Congress began to make plans to receive the 
emissary from France, Conrad-Alexandre Gerard.  Henry Laurens played an important 
role in the establishment of the official exchange of representatives between the allies.  
His interactions with Gerard allowed Laurens to learn more of French intentions in 
America once the war had concluded.     
 Gerard had been dispatched by the court of France to represent the interests of his 
government in the United States.  Accompanying him on his journey to America was a  
squadron of warships that had been dispatched to protect the beleaguered coastline of the 
United States.  Aboard the French vessel Lanquedoc, Vice-Admiral Count Charles-Henri 
d’Estaing informed the president, “I have the honor sir to remit to your excellency [a] 
copy of my credential letter.”273  Count d’Estaing headed a fleet of 14 warships and five 
frigates, which had been sent at the behest of the French government and at the urging of 
the American Minister Plenipotentiary in Paris, Benjamin Franklin.274   
 The count also informed Laurens that “a minister who has been so happy as to 
have had the indelible glory of signing a treaty which unites two powers whose interests 
are so intimately connected,” would be following his arrival.  The count was referring to 
the imminent arrival of Gerard, who was on board the French fleet.275  Writing to North 
Carolina Governor Richard Caswell, President Laurens urged him “to pursue the most 
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effectual measures to apprise the commander of the French squadron, Le Compte 
d’Estaing, of any English ships of war which may come into any of the harbors or inlets 
of the state of North Carolina.”  The president further urged Governor Caswell to 
“accommodate the squadron or any of the ships of our ally the King of France with 
proper pilots,” for navigating American rivers, “if required.”276  The moment that Henry 
Laurens had hoped for had arrived.  France was sending military assistance to the United 
States to aid in its struggle for independence.  Congress followed Laurens’ suggestion in 
July of 1778, and ordered the Commander-in-Chief and the American military to 
cooperate with d’Estaing.277   
 With the arrival of French military assistance, the English view of the war in 
America began to change.  At the beginning of July, Laurens had been made aware of a 
political upheaval within Great Britain.  According to the news articles, published in 
England in April of 1778, the British Parliament had discussed the idea of authorizing 
American independence as a condition for negotiation.  Laurens noted that “the whole 
nation” had entered a period of “great distraction.”278  To the Count d’Estaing, President 
Laurens forwarded the response of the Continental Congress to the repeated letters from 
the British peace commission.  He took this action as a sign that America was firm in its 
devotion to the alliance with France.  He also urged d’Estaing “to open a communication 
with General Washington” in order that the French and American forces might cooperate 
in their military endeavors against “our common enemy.”279  To Washington, the 
president remarked, “it is unnecessary to intimate to your excellency the propriety of 
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opening and keeping up a correspondence with Admiral Count d’Estaing,” to further that 
purpose.280  An official resolution reiterating this request was written by a committee of 
the Congress and sent to Washington on July 11, 1778.281                       
 Laurens’ diplomatic efforts did not extend solely to inter-state and foreign 
political relations.  Keeping a positive relationship with the military officers of the 
Continental Army was equally important.  When the French military came to assist the 
Americans, establishing a positive relationship with the French military became a key 
component to the success of the alliance.  In fact, his efforts to build up the French 
alliance resulted in the American government moving away from any potential thought of 
reconciliation with Great Britain.  This became especially important as Laurens received 
Conrad-Alexandre Gerard, the new French minister.  At Laurens’ insistence, Congress 
immediately appointed a committee to prepare for the official reception of the 
emissary.282
 Shortly after Gerard arrived in America, Laurens began a personal relationship 
with him as a means of furthering the alliance.  Though the congressional committee 
discussed the proper honors and tributes to bestow on the ambassador, the president 
wanted to learn more about his mission to the United States by transcending political 
relationships and establishing a friendship with him.283  “He intimated to me his powers 
for appearing in the character of Minister Plenipotentiary, or more simply, a resident,” 
Laurens wrote.  “The court of France probably could not have discovered a man in 
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Europe so equal to the task,” he continued, “as is Monsieur Gerard--a man of politeness, 
good breeding, and affability without troublesome ceremony.”284   
 Laurens took the time to get to know Gerard, not only the parameters of his 
diplomatic mission but his personal motivations for supporting the American cause.  It 
was Gerard’s hope to be recognized as a full ambassador by the Congress since he had 
arrived from France with full powers from the king.  Though Laurens informed Gerard 
that such a decision “awaited the determination of Congress,” he advocated such a 
distinction be made.  What had motivated Laurens to pursue this course was his concern 
over the interests of the United States among the powers of Europe.  Congress was also 
concerned about the status of the American representatives in France and whether or not 
they held such a distinction.285
 In his discussions with Gerard, Laurens learned the answer to a question that had 
perplexed him since his first months in Congress.  When pressed about the disaffected 
French officers who had applied to Congress for military commission and had been 
rebuffed, Gerard said that he was aware of their complaints.  However, realizing that not 
every individual who had applied for such a commission was worthy, Gerard reported 
that “Congress would never be troubled with petitions under his auspices.”286  This 
answer settled a very pressing concern for Henry Laurens.  Should Congress continue to 
promote foreign notables over qualified American soldiers, a serious problem would 
result.  “Many of our American officers have abandoned their homes, all their domestic 
happiness, the education of their children, the improvement of their fortunes,” Laurens 
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wrote to the Marquis de Lafayette, “…and have the mortification of being commanded by 
gentlemen who had held Lieutenancies in their native country, and who were promoted 
here after one battle.”287
 Conrad-Alexandre Gerard, French Minister Plenipotentiary, was officially 
presented to the Continental Congress on August 6, 1778.  After giving his official 
greeting on behalf of the king of France, Gerard pledged that France would not cease in 
its determination to end the war until the United States had been recognized by Great 
Britain as an independent nation.  “His majesty hath hastened to send you a powerful 
assistance, which you owe only to his friendship,” Gerard announced, “to the sincere 
regard he has for every thing which relates to the advantage of the United States…”288  
After concluding his remarks, the minister was officially introduced to the Congress.  In 
his official welcome to the French representative, President Laurens commented that 
“had it rested solely with the most Christian King, not only the independence of these 
states would have been universally acknowledged, but their tranquility fully 
established.”289  “The virtuous citizens of America,” he continued, “can never forget his 
beneficent attention to their violated rights, nor cease to acknowledge the hand of a 
gracious Providence in raising them up so powerful and illustrious a friend.”290        
 By the middle of July, a de facto state of war existed between France and Great 
Britain.  Laurens received news of this development from the American Commissioners 
in France, Benjamin Franklin and John Adams.  With the naval assistance of the Count 
d’Estaing, the costal areas of the United States were given protection from the British 
                                                          
287  HL to the Marquis de Lafayette, July 18, 1778, Papers.  Chesnutt, 14: 46.   
288  Ford, JCC, 11: 754-756.   
289  Ford, JCC, 11: 756-757. 
290  Ibid, 11: 757.   
 
 90
navy.  However, Adams informed the president that the king of France had now ordered 
his ships of war to begin attacking English vessel and had given his official assent to 
privateers.  The American Revolution had now entered a stage of total war between two 
of the most powerful nations on earth.  “War is not declared,” Adams wrote, “that is no 
manifesto had been published…but each nation is daily manufacturing materials for the 
other’s manifesto, by open hostilities.”291  Adams also warned the president not to heed 
the peace overtures made by the British government as they were insulting to the national 
dignity of the nation.  Laurens agreed on this point and had given every indication of 
resisting the attempts by the British peace commission to persuade Congress to accept 
their peace proposals.292                    
 The incident that further strengthened Laurens’ resolve concerned the repeated 
attempts of the British peace commission to bribe members of Congress into supporting 
their proposals.  On July 9, 1778, Congress had requested its members to bring forward 
“all letters received from any of the British peace commissioners or their agents, or from 
any subject of the king of Great Britain of a public nature.”  This was an attempt by the 
majority of the members of Congress to determine just how far the peace commissioners 
would go in their attempt to break down the resolve of the government.  Laurens had 
been opposed to this plan when originally considered in June of 1778, on the grounds that 
a person’s private mail should not be considered by the eyes of the entire government.  “I 
could not forbear offering some objections,” he wrote to Washington, “it appeared to be a 
dangerous attempt to stretch the powers of Congress.”293  However, as news was received 
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of clandestine offers to members of Congress from representatives of the crown, his 
resistance faded somewhat.     
 Though he still did not support the idea of an individual’s private correspondence 
being submitted for public consumption, Laurens offered no resistance to the decision of 
the Congress.  He explained his change of opinion in a letter to General Washington 
dated July 31, 1778.  In this letter, the president charged the British peace commission 
with sabotaging any attempt at negotiations, “having by various means, attempted to 
bride Congress.”  To Laurens, this information represented “the highest possible affront 
to the representatives of a virtuous, independent people,” and further “rendered wholly 
unworthy of the further regard of Congress in their ambassadorial character.”294  Laurens 
referred to a letter sent to Pennsylvania Delegate Joseph Reed from George Johnstone, a 
member of the British peace commission.  This letter alluded to potential benefits for 
Reed if he were to support the commission and advocate a peace settlement between 
Great Britain and the United States.295  “I have for several days past,” Laurens explained, 
“urged my friends to move Congress for a resolve that will hold no conference with such 
men.”296    
 Laurens was concerned over the ramifications of such attempts to persuade 
members of Congress.  Not only could such a discovery undermine the usefulness of the 
national assembly, but it could have diplomatic ramifications throughout Europe.  “I am 
commonly tenacious of my own ideas,” he wrote of his advocacy for the motion to break 
off contact with the commission, “but in the present, as in the former case, I feel as if I 
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clearly perceived many good effects which will be produced by a proper act on our 
part.”297  Though the motion eventually failed to gain support in the Congress, the 
attempts at bribery did not stop.  When another delegate presented a similar letter to the 
president, Laurens immediately went to Congress and demanded that they take a more 
active stance.298                    
 On August 11, 1778, Delegates Joseph Reed and Robert Morris of Pennsylvania 
laid before the Congress the private letters sent to them by George Johnstone.  The letters 
were read publicly at the insistence of President Laurens and officially entered into the 
congressional record.299  To Reed, Johnstone indicated that “the man who can be 
instrumental in bringing us all to act once more in harmony,” would have the gratitude of 
the king and the thanks of the people of Great Britain.  He had made a similar offer to 
Delegate Morris, offering him “honor and emolument” for guiding the Congress into 
accepting the British reconciliation plan.  While both of the delegates had indicated that 
they were not swayed by such offers, they were obligated to present Johnstone’s letters to 
the Congress.  After serious debate, the Congress resolved to have no more contact with 
George Johnstone respecting peace with Great Britain.  While this resolution did not cut 
off communication with the entire commission, it did single Johnstone out for his 
attempted subversion of the Continental Congress.  Laurens immediately sent a copy of 
the resolution to the peace commission, now located in New York.  The letter that 
accompanied the resolution accused the commission of breach of faith and indicated that 
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such actions would not be tolerated by the government of the United States.300
 Throughout the remainder of his presidency, Laurens worked to solidify the 
French alliance, although at times he became frustrated with the demands of Count 
d’Estaing.  Laurens also disagreed with the Marquis de Lafayette on the revitalization of 
a military expedition into Canada, a proposal that both Laurens and Washington realized 
would be futile.  While their relationship did not suffer from this disagreement, Laurens 
became wary of the demands of the French with respect to the United States.  Thinking of 
the future status of the nation among the powers of Europe, Laurens dedicated his energy 
to resisting the continual reliance on foreign loans, as they would increase debt in the 
United States.  He was also concerned over the future of the United States once the war 
with Britain had concluded.  What type nation would exist in the aftermath of the war, 
when American had relied on the assistance of powerful countries like France and Spain.  
These were the major issues that the president contended with throughout the remainder 
of his exhausting term as President of the Continental Congress. 
 While Laurens was the first member of Congress to rejoice at the signing of the 
treaty of alliance, he realized that it was not a perfect document.  He withheld his public 
criticism of the treaty to foster an open and mutually beneficial relationship with France.  
Laurens was concerned over the annexation of Florida by Spain as compensation for their 
assistance in the war effort.  While the treaty did not indicate that Spain would gain 
control of Florida in exchange for its military assistance, it was a possibility that Laurens 
had considered.  “We have nothing new from Spain,” he wrote to New Jersey Governor 
William Livingston, “gentlemen not only smiled, but laughed at my ideas expressed 
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while we were reading the treaty with France, that the Spaniard had his eye upon the 
Floridas…”301  After a conversation with Don Juan de Miralles, a Spanish observer living 
in York who apprised the Spanish government on the political developments in America, 
Laurens commented that he had “received strong confirmation of my suspicions.”  While 
dining with Don Juan, Laurens learned that Spain did have an interest in regaining 
control of Florida as a means of achieving a foothold on trade with the southern states.  
“This I really mean sir, as a secret,” Laurens wrote, “and if we keep it so, the discovery 
may be applied to good purposes when we come to treat in earnest.”  As always, Laurens 
was thinking of the possible benefits of working out a settlement with Spain that would 
be separate from any agreement that would come through France.  “I am afraid our 
present commissioners are not apprized,” Laurens concluded, “of the immense value to 
our whole union of St. Augustine and Bahama, and that too many of us here, view the 
possession in a light of partial benefit.”302
 In late of August of 1778, the Marquis de Bretigney proposed an invasion into 
British held territory of East Florida, which Laurens brought before the Congress.  The 
previous American expedition into the region in July of 1778 had been an abysmal 
failure.  Laurens described the situation as an “unhappy circumstance” which “will add to 
the distress of Georgia, and increase her cries for relief.”  The American forces had 
previously been routed and taken severe losses against the British battalions in this effort 
to free up the region from British control and relieve the embattled southern states.303  
When the plan for an all out assault on the region was proposed by Bretigney, Laurens 
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was somewhat skeptical as to its potential for success.     
 Congress agreed to employ a military expedition against the British in East 
Florida under the command of Major General Benjamin Lincoln in November of 1778.304  
This expedition was vital to the security of the southern states, particularly Georgia and 
South Carolina.  To gather the necessary personnel for this expedition, Congress allotted 
land bounties for all those who joined the general until the area had been reduced and 
occupied by American forces.  Realizing the vital importance of this campaign, not only 
to the safety of the southern states but to America’s bargaining power in the region, 
Laurens advocated granting every soldier involved in the attack a portion of the land that 
was seized.  Originally, the Congress had intended only to allot these land bounties to the 
commanding officers and their support staffs.  However, Laurens knew that the citizen 
soldier who had enlisted in the regiment was important, and needed proper motivation to 
leave their homes and join Lincoln in Florida.305     
 While the command of the invasion force was bestowed on Lincoln, the 
Continental Army was augmented by the militia units from Georgia, Maryland, Virginia, 
and South Carolina.  This required the cooperation of the various state executives, some 
of whom were understandably concerned about the defense of their own states.  To his 
own home state, Laurens asked for immediate cooperation while at the same time 
insisting that it was not the position of Congress to imply that the state leadership had no 
control over their individual militias.306  Cooperation among the states was important to 
the success of this mission.  Congress continued to debate the issue of the attack on East 
                                                          
304  HL to Richard Caswell, November 14, 1778, Papers, Volume Fourteen.  Chesnutt, 486-487.    
305  JCC, Volume Twelve.  Ford, 949-951. 
306  South Carolina Delegates to Rawlins Lowndes, November 14, 1778, Papers.  Chesnutt, 14: 489.   
 
 96
Florida through November of 1778 and into the first week of December, where it was 
decided that such a proposal would be futile and result in great injury to the southern 
states.307     
 At the same time the Congress worked out the particulars of an invasion into East 
Florida, it was confronted with another ghost from its past.  In September of 1778, 
General Horatio Gates and General Jacob Bayley submitted a report to General 
Washington outlining the potential for another military expedition into Canada.  
Washington subsequently submitted this report to the Congress, which approved of it in 
October of that same year.  Congress ordered Laurens to write to Benjamin Franklin in 
France and to consult with the French government on the validity of the plan.  Although 
at the time Laurens assumed that it was Lafayette who had revitalized the concept of an 
invasion into Canada, the Marquis had only supported the idea.  However, when 
Congress ordered General Washington to begin outlining the supplies necessary for an 
invasion into Canada, both were certain that the idea originated with Lafayette.308   
 This resulted in a series of misunderstandings regarding the expedition.  
Lieutenant Colonel John Laurens informed the president that the Marquis de Lafayette 
was desirous of introducing his plan for using French forces as a part of the Canadian 
expedition.  Lafayette had informed Washington that Canada could not be taken solely by 
American forces, but would require a Frenchman at the head of the army to sway the 
hearts of the people.  John Laurens further warned his father that allowing the French to 
have a foothold in Canada could cause problems for the United States in the future.  John 
Laurens worried about the potential manipulation of trade by the French, should they gain 
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control of Canada.309  Washington privately confessed that France could use Canada as a 
means to gain a foothold on valuable trade with Indian nations and monopolize the 
fishing industry of Newfoundland.  The president was also concerned over this 
possibility.310
 As Washington prepared his report for the Congress, Laurens began to seriously 
reconsider the proposed attack.  “I believe, and upon good ground,” he wrote, “the 
scheme for an expedition into Canada in concert with the army of France originated in 
the breast of Marquis de Lafayette…”  While Laurens felt that this plan was created with 
“the purest motives,” it was still a dangerous idea that was complicated “with eventual 
mischiefs.”311  What greatly concerned the president regarding a joint operation with 
France would be the financial straits it would put on the American government.  Even if 
France were to assume the greater responsibility in the campaign, the American 
government would still need to rely on French loans.  “I was one of the six unsuccessful 
opponents to the resolution for borrowing money from France,” he added, “we have in 
this single article plunged the union into a vast amount of debt.”  Commenting on the 
example this would set for the United States abroad, Laurens predicted “imminent danger 
of dishonor and disgrace.”312  This represented a problem that Laurens had noticed from 
his first weeks as a member of the Continental Congress.  If America were to rely too 
heavily on the assistance of foreign nations, it would soon place itself in a position where 
it would not be able to subsist alone.  Furthermore, a dependence on foreign assistance 
would undermine the very concept of American liberty.  “Every million livres you 
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borrow,” Laurens argued, “implies a pledge of your lands…”  “If the prosecution of so 
extensive a project is from the present state of our army and funds impracticable,” he 
concluded, “…I trust the Marquis will be satisfied with such reasonings in apology for 
our desisting from the pursuit of his favorite enterprise as our circumstances will 
dictate.”313
 In order to pay for this mission, Laurens predicted that the Congress would have 
to raise $20 million in taxes for the coming year.  “This heavy tax,” he confessed, “and 
the prospect of increasing impositions will show our constituents the necessity of 
consolidating our strength, as well as the impropriety and danger of new military 
enterprises.”314  Laurens forwarded the Commander-in-Chief’s objections on the proposed 
invasion to the Congress, where it was considered by the Board of War.  Adding his own 
objections on the grounds that such an endeavor would be costly and detrimental to the 
security of the nation, Laurens advocated that Congress cancel the planned invasion.  
After considerable debate, the second proposed invasion into Canada was cancelled by 
Congress in January of 1779.315  Laurens wrote to Lafayette explaining the government’s 
decision.  “Although the emancipation of Canada is a very desirable object,” he assured 
the Marquis, “…considering the exhausted state of their resources, and the derangement 
of their finances, they conceive it very problematical whether they could make any solid 
impression in that quarter.”316  
 With the abandonment of the extraneous invasion plans, Laurens was able to 
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focus his attention on settling another past matter.  “Mr. Deane is returned to Congress in 
pursuance of an order in the last winter,” Laurens wrote to Rawlins Lowndes in July of 
1778.317  The question over Silas Deane’s actions while serving as American 
Commissioner to France was of great concern for many within the Congress, including 
President Laurens.  The state of affairs among the American representatives in France 
was becoming bothersome to the government and Deane’s actions while in Paris had 
caused a great stir during Laurens’ first months in Congress.318   
 Silas Deane had promised dozens of wealthy Frenchmen commissions in the 
Continental Army in exchange for their financial support.  As the numerous French 
military figures crowded the halls of Congress in September of 1777, Laurens had noted 
the dangers of allowing these men commissions in the army over native born citizens of 
the states.319  Despite his recall, Deane did not actually return to the United States until 
well after the treaty of alliance with France had been signed.  Commanded by Congress 
“to give, from his memory, a general account of his whole transactions in France,” Deane 
began describing his transaction while in Paris on August 15, 1778.  Regarding Deane’s 
testimony, Laurens wrote “we know too much, and yet I almost fear we know nothing of 
our affairs in Europe.”320    
 While Gerard, Franklin, and even the French Foreign Minister, Charles Gravier de 
Vergennes, had all spoken highly of Deane, Laurens commented “I shall form no 
conclusion until I learn much more than has hitherto come to my knowledge.”321  While 
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there were some members of the Congress who had indeed formed their own conclusions 
on Silas Deane’s action while in Paris, Henry Laurens endeavored to reserve his 
judgment--at least publicly.  It was clear from his writings in November of 1777, that 
Laurens did not approve of Deane’s methods.  However, when Deane published an 
account of the supposed disputes among the commissioners in Paris in the December 5th 
issue of The Pennsylvania Packet, his detractors in Congress became incensed.  
Addressing the “free and virtuous citizens of America,” Deane attempted to take his case 
to the people.322  The result would forever sully Deane’s reputation among the members 
of the Continental Congress and be the root cause of Henry Laurens’ resignation as its 
president. 
 Referring to Deane’s letter as an “unnecessary appeal,” Laurens sought to address 
the matter within the Congress.  Deane’s letter had “created anxieties in the minds of the 
good people of this city,” and contained accusations “highly derogatory to the honor and 
interests of these United States.”  Laurens, seeing Deane’s statements as “dishonorable,” 
urged the Congress to appoint a committee to review and critique his comments 
regarding the other commissioners in France and the defamatory statements made 
regarding the Continental Congress.  Before the vote could be taken, a motion was made 
to adjourn Congress.  Despite the president’s objection, the house adjourned.323  Laurens 
took this action to be a sign of the divisions within the Congress.  Though he had 
witnessed such conflicts between his colleagues before, they had never prevented his 
attempts to settle a matter.  Insulted, Laurens sent out a hasty letter to General 
Washington that alluded to his next course of action.  “You will be pleased sir,” he wrote, 
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“to direct your next dispatches to the President of Congress, who will not be the 
subscriber.”  Laurens promised the general that he would continue to assist him “in my 
private character,” as best he could.324    
 The records of the Continental Congress for December 9, 1778 indicate that 
before any business could be transacted, the president rose from his the chair and, after a 
brief address outlining his reasons, resigned his responsibilities.  After serving the 
national assembly for over a year, Laurens returned to his seat as a delegate from South 
Carolina and allowed Congress to appoint someone else to contend with the tumultuous 
dictates of the national government.325  All evidence indicates that Henry Laurens took 
this action over a point of honor concerning Silas Deane’s actions regarding the 
American delegation to France.  There is no indication in the records of the Continental 
Congress that Laurens was asked to resign.  Nor is there a record of an attempt to remove 
him from his position.  He simply resigned.  Aside from being exhausted at having served 
as president for slightly over a year, Laurens was offended by the quick dismissal of his 
objections over Silas Deane’s actions.  For Laurens, it was a matter of personal honor.  At 
this time in the United States, the concept of honor was held in the highest regard.  Any 
infringement on a man’s honor was a source of tension.326      
On December 10, 1778, John Jay of New York was elected to fill the void created 
by Laurens’ resignation.327  While Laurens’ service as president was now over, he would 
not so quickly give up his national responsibilities.  Rather, Laurens remained an active 
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member of the Continental Congress and continued to have a positive effect on the course 
of the American Revolution.               
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                                             Chapter Five: A Life in Service 
 
 Although Henry Laurens had been elected to another term as president of the 
Continental Congress in November of 1778, his anguish over the factions within 
Congress during the deposition of Silas Deane had compelled him to leave office barely 
one month later.  Nonetheless, Laurens decided to remain in Congress as a representative 
of South Carolina.  “I had never any ambition to sit in the chair of Congress,” he 
explained to Samuel Huntingdon in December of 1778, “and when I had sat one complete 
year in it, I urged the house to make a better choice for filling it.”  Laurens commented 
that it was “the unanimous voice then present requesting me to continue added to another 
circumstance overbalanced my determination to retire.”  Holding his position and the 
status of Congress to be sacred in the affairs of the nation, Laurens explained that were he 
to continue as president amid the public statements made by Silas Deane he would be 
guilty of dishonoring the spirit of the position and the dignity of the national government 
itself.  Deane had exposed the internal disputes between the American commissioners in 
Paris in widely published letter in December of 1778.  This had caused another internal 
dispute within the government.  Laurens’ sense of honor regarding the factions within 
Congress compelled him to step aside rather than become embroiled in yet another 
partisan conflict that could destabilize the national government.  Laurens felt that should 
Congress focus on national affairs and avoid internal disputes between its membership.328  
 Despite the circumstances that had brought about his resignation as president, 
Laurens was appointed by his colleagues to the Committee of Commerce on December 
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14, 1778.  The following week he was elected to chair that committee.329  It was during 
his service in this capacity that Laurens was able to convince the Congress to abandon the 
proposed Canada invasion on the grounds that there simply was not enough money for 
such an adventure.  No longer bound to mediate the debates of the government, Laurens 
publicly stated his opinion on the issue and urged the assembly to drop the plan.  His 
separation from the chair allowed him to express his view more forcefully than before.330  
Throughout his next year in Congress, Laurens was appointed to committees on finance 
and military relations.  He continued to serve the interests of the United States well and 
received the thanks of his colleagues numerous times with assignment to powerful 
committee posts.  The remaining years of his life were dedicated to public service and 
continuing the growth of young nation.331      
 When the Congress finally agreed to compensate its presidents for their services, 
Laurens was deeply honored.  Having spent a great deal of his own money to maintain 
lodging and provide a carriage for transportation, Laurens was grateful to be 
compensated.  This decision affected President Jay more than Laurens, due to the fact 
that Congress also resolved to provide a suitable house and carriage for the current 
president.  Laurens and his predecessors were asked to submit an account of all their 
expenses during their term of office.  This resolution benefited the heirs of the late Peyton 
Randolph, as well as John Hancock and Henry Laurens.332  “I entreat you,” he wrote to 
President Jay on December 16, 1778, “to return my grateful acknowledgements to the 
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house, expressed in the enclosed paper.”333   
 Privately, though, Laurens confessed that the Congress had not come to this 
decisions easily.  Those members of Congress who were offended by Laurens’ 
resignation had argued over the wording of his official letter of thanks.  In the end, the 
house unanimously resolved to thank Laurens for his services in the execution of public 
business.  To Rawlins Lowndes, the former president expressed a sense of relief at being 
“released from the chair.”  Now, “my attention shall be bent to the investigation of the 
secret and commercial committee accounts…forsaking all thoughts of my private affairs 
for some time longer.”334  This seemed to be a theme in Laurens’ private life, in that he 
deferred attending to his own affairs to serve the nation. 
   When Congress began an open debate on the prospects for attaining a loan from 
Holland, Laurens was at the forefront of the discussions.  By this time, President Jay had 
been appointed Minster to Spain to secure financial and military assistance from that 
government.  In yet another desperate bid for funds, Congress also resolved to appoint a 
commissioner to the Netherlands whose express purpose would be to negotiate a loan for 
the United States.  On October 13, 1779, Laurens presented a letter from Lieutenant 
Colonel Jacob Gerhard Dirik outlining the potential for obtaining a loan from Holland.  A 
committee, of which Laurens was a member, reviewed the letter and suggested that the 
Congress appoint a proper individual to negotiate the loan.  Jonathan Trumbull, Sr. had 
forwarded Lieutenant Colonel Dirik’s letter to Henry Laurens and requested that he 
present it to Congress.  On several occasions, the Congress refused to consider the letter 
on the basis that it did not contain important business.  Laurens continued to advocate for 
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its committal and finally placed the letter in the hands of President Samuel Huntingdon in 
October of 1779.335      
 The resolution empowering the American commissioner called for a man who 
possessed superior accounting skills and the ability to attain contacts in the mercantile 
field.  Having spent most of his life in the merchant trade, Henry Laurens was the perfect 
man for the task.  He was the first individual to have his name placed in nomination, and 
when the vote was taken he was appointed to the position.336  On October 30,1779, a 
special committee expanded Laurens’ mandate and empowered him to negotiate a “treaty 
of amity and commerce with the United Provinces of the low countries.”337  On 
November 1, 1779, he was appointed the first American Commissioner to the United 
Provinces of the low countries.  He was empowered to seek out a low interest loan and 
establish a diplomatic relationship with the Dutch.338
 Laurens left the city of Philadelphia on November 9, 1779 and immediately set 
out for South Carolina.339  Arriving in Charles Town on December 10, 1779, Laurens was 
perplexed to find that none of his instructions from the Congress had arrived.  He had no 
written mandate from the American government to pursue a loan, nor did he possess the 
treaty that had been written by the Committee on Foreign Affairs.  Lacking a proper staff, 
and even an assistant, Laurens wrote to President Samuel Huntingdon.  “I have not been 
furnished with the act for my appointment,” he commented, “for the appointment of a 
secretary, with commission and instructions for negotiating a treaty of commerce with the 
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United States of the Netherlands…nor has the opportunity offered for my sailing to 
Europe.”340  Those ships that were available at Charles Town harbor were bound for 
France and could not transport the frustrated commissioner to his destination.  Laurens 
was forced to seek his own method of transportation to the Netherlands.341               
      Even though the proper instruction outlining his diplomatic mission had failed 
to arrive in South Carolina, Laurens began to keep an account of his mission.  The 
financial and personal records of this journey from Philadelphia to South Carolina are an 
accurate portrayal of what occurred during his voyage to the Netherlands.  Even before 
he left the United States, Laurens had spent over $13,315 transporting his belongings, 
personal papers, and shipping a supply of leather that he purchased in South Carolina for 
the board of war.342  In the time between his request for orders from the Continental 
Congress and his departure for the Netherlands, Laurens was able to return to the realm 
of regional politics, being elected to the South Carolina House of Representatives in 
January of 1780.  It was during this service that Henry Laurens introduced a progressive 
proposal that had been advocated by John Laurens, when Henry Laurens was president of 
Congress. 
 Though he only served in the House of Representatives for two full days, Laurens 
was able to introduce a bill that provided for the enlistment of free blacks in the South 
Carolina militia.  After the proposal was rewritten, a committee of the house agreed that 
free blacks would be a necessary addition for the South Carolina militia.  The house 
approved of the plan and further ordered that commissioners be appointed to enlist 1,000 
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freed blacks as a source of labor to assist with the defense of the state.  Though they 
would not be directly involved in the fighting, these laborers were to receive 
compensation for their efforts.343  This proposal represented a serious ideological victory 
for John Laurens, who had encouraged his father to support a similar proposal during his 
presidency.  Beginning in 1778, John Laurens had requested that the then President 
Laurens propose the enlistment of a regiment of black soldiers in the Continental 
Army.344  Though the elder Laurens did not wish to discourage his son, he realized that 
such a bold plan would meet with heavy resistance among the members of Congress.  He 
further argued that to conscript a regiment of slaves and free blacks into a military unit 
was no better than slavery itself.345  He changed his mind after repeated entreaties from 
John Laurens, when Henry finally saw the opportunity to advance this idea. 
 When a British fleet arrived off the coast of South Carolina in February of 1780, 
Laurens informed the Committee on Foreign Affairs that he would set out on his own to 
North Carolina to attain passage on a ship bound for Europe.  “In the meantime,” he 
added, “I shall omit no opportunity of acquainting you with my circumstances.”346  This 
was a reference to the lack of communication from the Congress regarding his mission.  
Once more, Laurens was about to embark on a journey that would be, at least for him, 
part improvisation. 
 In April of 1780, Laurens went to Wilmington, North Carolina to board a 
European-bound vessel, but found it difficult to obtain passage.  Every available ship was 
being used to either supply the states or fight off the British.  The French vessels were 
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constantly engaged in maneuvers against the British, which delayed Laurens’ diplomatic 
mission.347                   
 As Charles Town was bombarded by British warships, Laurens learned that the 
South Carolina government was in flight to Camden.  When the city surrendered on May 
12, 1780, over 2,600 American prisoners were taken by the British, including Lieutenant 
Colonel John Laurens.  “Upon my honor,” Laurens wrote to the South Carolina 
delegation in Congress, “I have not shed one tear, from any consideration respecting my 
son or myself.”  “Let not this damping picture incline us to despondency,” he continued, 
“but, impel us to act with more wisdom, more vigor for the relief of our unhappy fellow 
citizens, the recovery of our country, and the establishment of our independence.”348  As 
he received reports from Charles Town outlining the devastation brought to the city by 
the American surrender, Laurens became more aware of the importance of attaining a 
loan from the Dutch.  A letter from John Laurens, now in captivity, reiterated this 
concern and fell heavily upon the elder Laurens.349   
 In July of 1780, Laurens finally received the official sanction of the Continental 
Congress to proceed on his mission to the Netherlands.  Having personally returned to 
Philadelphia to determine what had held the official response from the Congress for so 
long, Laurens began his journey to the Netherlands in August of 1780 aboard the 
Mercury.350  His personal journal, kept throughout the next two years, contains detailed 
notes on the voyage.   
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 In his trunk, Henry Laurens carried an “unauthenticated” copy of the proposed 
treaty between the United Provinces and the United States of America.  Angered at the 
fact that Congress had not given him the authentic treaty to be signed, Laurens “threw it 
into a trunk” containing documents that he intended to go over at a later date.351  On 
September 3, 1780, the Mercury was stopped by the British frigate Vestal under the 
command of Captain George Keppel.  “Captain Keppel received me on board in a stile 
humane and polite,” Laurens wrote, “I presented my sword and purse to him, he desired 
me to keep both.”  Henry Laurens was now prisoner of the British.352
 In his journal, Laurens details his efforts to dispose of the treaty and his personal 
papers so they would not fall into the hands of his captors.  The documents were safely 
deposited in a “long bag” and thrown overboard by Laurens’ secretary, Major Moses 
Young.  While the bag was heavy enough to sink, an air pocket inside it prevented this 
from occurring.  A sailor on the Vestal pulled the bag from the sea and the treaty was 
recovered.  Laurens commented that Captain Keppel performed his duties well and was 
worthy of praise for the respectful way he treated his prisoner.  “I shall now be sent to 
England,” Laurens wrote, “where I shall be of more real service to my own country than I 
could possibly be in any other part of Europe.”  Despite the fact that his diplomatic 
mission to the Netherlands was, under his present circumstances, a total failure, Lauren 
maintained a positive attitude.353                
 Transferred to the British vessel Fairy, Laurens arrived in England on September 
19, 1780.  Placed under the guard of a young Lieutenant named Norris, Laurens was 
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taken to London.  When Lieutenant Norris was visiting friends in Exeter for several days, 
Laurens had the opportunity to escape his captor and disappear into the English 
countryside.  He chose to remain and face the ordeal that was coming to him.  “I feel no 
inclination to escape,” he replied to William Knox, undersecretary of state for the 
American colonies, who actually encouraged Laurens to slip away while the Lieutenant 
was remiss in his duties.354  Arriving in London on October 6, 1780, Laurens was escorted 
under heavy guard to White Hall to meet with members of the king’s privy council.  
After his interview, Laurens was confined to the Tower of London on the charge of 
suspicion of high treason against the crown.355  Locked up at night, and under the custody 
of two guards, Henry Laurens was denied the right to write or receive correspondence.  
When a bystander commented on the unfortunate situation that Laurens was reduced to 
and that it was likely that he would die in the tower, Laurens responded, “I shall not leave 
a bone with you.”356
 Henry Laurens spent fifteen months as a prisoner in the Tower of London.  In that 
time he was subjected to several attacks of gout and suffered from numerous health 
ailments.357  When asked by an old friend named Oswald to apologize to the British 
government for his actions during the revolution, Laurens responded “I will never 
subscribe to my own infamy and to the dishonor of my children.”  Even though Oswald 
had assured Laurens that he would be pardoned for his crimes against the crown if he 
could offer some sign of contrition, Laurens refused to assent.  In his mind, he had 
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nothing to be sorry for.358   
 Throughout every interview with members of the privy council and 
representatives from the British government, Laurens refused to denounce the American 
cause.  On December 31, 1781, Laurens was transported to Searjant’s Inn for a hearing 
on his possible release from the tower.  When asked to swear an oath on “our sovereign 
Lord, the King,” Laurens exclaimed “not my sovereign!”359  By this time, General 
Charles Cornwallis, second in command of the British army in North America, had 
surrendered to the Continental Army at Yorktown.360  The fighting was over, the United 
States and their allies had won the war for independence.   
Laurens was released from the Tower of London in January of 1781, officially 
exchanged for Lord Cornwallis.  After recuperating in Bath, England, Laurens was 
informed that Congress had appointed him as one of America’s commissioners to the 
peace conference in Paris.  After over a year as a prisoner of the British, Laurens was 
now empowered to settle the terms of their surrender and attain official recognition of 
American independence.361  Though uncertain of the legality of his status, Laurens met 
with John Adams in Holland on April 14, 1782 to discuss the conditions for negotiating 
with Great Britain.  Both men agreed that no negotiations would take place unless 
America was recognized by Great Britain as a sovereign nation.362  Back in England, 
Laurens worked to impress this upon the earl of Shelburne, who was a member of Prime 
Minister Rockingham’s cabinet.  In a private meeting with the earl, Laurens insisted that 
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the United States be recognized as an independent nation and that their rights be secured 
for the future.363
 Devastating news and personal hardship seem to be integral factors in the life of 
Henry Laurens.  On August 27, 1782, Lieutenant Colonel John Laurens was killed 
fighting a contingent of British troops at Chehaw Neck, South Carolina.364  While resting 
at Bath, Laurens received news of his son’s death through John Adams.  “I feel for you, 
more than I can or ought express,” Adams wrote, “our country has lost its most promising 
character.”365  Aware of the fact that America was in need of his voice, Laurens 
responded to Adams that he would comply with the wishes of Congress and attend the 
peace conference.  “Thank God,” he concluded, “I had a son who dared die in defense of 
his country.”  His emotional wound was deep, the deepest he had felt in many years, but 
Laurens was dedicated to the cause of independence.  With the end of the war now 
assured and the looming prospect of peace, he could not delay his departure any longer.366  
Once more, his private affairs would have to wait. 
 Frustrated at the fact that no official settlement of the war between the United 
States and Great Britain had yet to be reached, Laurens set out for Paris in December of 
1782.  He had spent the last year working with the British government in London to try 
and reach a settlement that immediately recognized the sovereign status of the United 
States.  Knowing the ministers at While Hall would communicate their terms with the 
British representatives in Paris, Laurens felt his advocacy would make a considerable 
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difference.  In this capacity he acted as a point of contact for the American 
representatives.  He used his time in London to serve as the rear guard for the American 
negotiations in Paris.367
 When the preliminary articles of peace were accepted by all parties in December 
of 1782, Laurens apprised the South Carolina delegation in Congress of the state of 
affairs.  “The treaty,” Laurens wrote to John Lewis Gervais, “…will give general 
satisfaction on our side of the water and prove to be the ground work for our future 
happiness.”368  Despite a few quarrels among the peace delegates over compensation for 
property losses, the definitive peace treaty concluding the American Revolution was 
signed on September 3, 1783.369   
 When he returned to Philadelphia from Europe in the summer of 1784, Laurens 
reported directly to the Continental Congress.  After giving his report, Laurens began the 
long trip to his home in South Carolina.  After serving the nation since 1777, Laurens 
now looked forward to a life of quiet retirement in the presence of his family and 
friends.370  Though he would endeavor to avoid holding political office throughout the 
remainder of his life, Henry Laurens remained active in the public world of American 
political thought.  The citizens of South Carolina expressed their gratitude to Henry 
Laurens by naming one of the state’s seven new judicial districts after him.  He was once 
more elected to the state legislature in 1785, but declined to serve due to personal 
reasons.  When urged to seek the office of Governor of South Carolina, he also refused.  
“I am now what I had not been for thirty proceeding years…” he commented on his 
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return to civilian life, “…‘tis happy for us when we know where to stop.”371                          
 Laurens was ready to stop and settle down for the first time since the late 1750s, 
when he had entered public service.  His financial affairs were in a state of near ruin as a 
result of the war for independence and his absence from Mepkin.  His plantations in 
Georgia had been seized by the British and put up for public auction in late 1787.  
Although this was not a phenomenon totally unique to Henry Laurens, the effect that this 
financial ruin had on his personal well being was just as draining as his presidential 
services ten years earlier.372   
 Throughout the next five years, Laurens remained a well respected public figure 
in South Carolina.  Having experienced the inherent flaws of the Articles of 
Confederation, Laurens became the proponent of a stronger union of the states.  Though 
he had been elected as one of South Carolina’s delegates to the Constitutional 
Convention in 1787, Laurens reported that he was “incapable of any arduous business.”  
While he was honored to once more be chosen by his peers to represent the interests of 
his state, he maintained that it would not possible for him to travel to Philadelphia.373  
Though he could not join his colleagues in Philadelphia, Laurens nevertheless expressed 
his opinions to those who updated him on the progress of the convention.  Philadelphia 
merchant William Bell was Laurens’ source of information during the debates.  While 
Bell was not a member of the Constitutional Convention, he was an observer of the 
situation and the conduct through which Henry Laurens was able to publicly express his 
feelings on the proposed Constitution.   
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 In a series of letters to Bell, Laurens voiced his concerns over the powers of the 
office of President of the United States.  “I have one capital objection,” he wrote in 
October of 1787, “they have given the intended President no coercive power in the 
passing of laws.”  Laurens further argued that if the convention were going to create such 
an office, “they should either have given him power, or entirely have omitted his name on 
that subject.”374  Bell published the letter in the next issue of the Pennsylvania Gazette 
without Laurens‘ knowledge.  The letter was subsequently reprinted in several other mid-
Atlantic news papers throughout October and November of 1787.  The subsequent 
articles credited Laurens with advocating the adoption of the proposed Constitution, 
provided that the convention amend its guidelines for the powers of the President.  Not 
wishing to overtly influence the delegates who were attending the convention, Laurens 
responded to Bell’s actions.  “…I acknowledge the system is an “improvement,” upon the 
present confederation,” Laurens wrote, “…in a work of such vast importance, ’tis our 
duty to proceed with cautious and wise deliberation.”375
 Laurens did get the opportunity to express his opinion on the final Constitution 
once it had been accepted by the convention in Philadelphia.  Elected as a delegate to 
South Carolina’s ratification convention, Laurens returned to Charles Town in April of 
1788.  The South Carolina ratification convention met from April 17 until May 28, 1788.  
When the vote was totaled, the new Constitution of the United States was approved by a 
vote of 149 to 73.  Henry Laurens apparently approved of the revisions made by the 
delegates in Philadelphia and voted in favor of the new document.376
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 When George Washington was a candidate for President of the United States, in 
the first election for that office, Henry Laurens was one of the electors from the state of 
South Carolina.377  Having expressed his displeasure at the inherent weakness of the 
presidency in the early drafts of the Constitution, Laurens was now satisfied that the new 
system would provide the firm leadership that the nation required.  Having experienced 
the limited authority of being President of Congress, Laurens recognized how much more 
effective a federal government would.    
 Retiring once more to Mepkin, Laurens surrounded himself with his children and 
their families.  On December 8, 1792, the man who never sought political distinction yet 
had found his life closely connected with the fortunes of the young American nation died 
at the age of 68.378  In accordance with his will, Laurens was cremated.379   
 History has underestimated the effect that Henry Laurens had on the course of the 
American Revolution and the success of the fragile young republic during its most 
tumultuous experience.  His interest in American rights was not confined to the sphere of 
his home in South Carolina.  When called to national service, he embraced his 
responsibility with stern determination despite any personal misgivings that he had 
entertained.  Laurens grew from a proponent of reconciliation into America’s fiercest 
advocate.  His gradual evolution from reconciliation into sovereignty was the direct result 
of his term as President of the Continental Congress.  With each crisis he encountered, 
Laurens became more determined to lead America through the stormy seas of revolution.   
 For slightly over one year, Henry Laurens was the political head of a developing 
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nation.  There were no set criterion on how the President of Congress was supposed to act 
or what powers he possessed.  Like his predecessors, Laurens had to improvise his role.  
Rather than taking the perspective of an observer, he became an active participant in the 
functions of the American government and used his position to put forward those ideas 
and political concepts that he felt were most essential to the success of the revolution.  At 
times, Laurens simply underscored the congressional resolutions that he thought were 
most important.  During more perplexing issues, he would take bold steps to find a 
solution.  His correspondence is the single greatest body of evidence to support this 
conclusion.      
 As his fellow delegates became distracted from their public duties and abandoned 
the Congress, Laurens was left with responsibility of moderating a waning government.  
Calling the remaining delegates into extra sessions, Laurens began a public 
correspondence that urged the individual states to replenish their congressional 
delegations.  The orders had come from Congress, but the sentiments were his own.  At a 
time when the nation was in need of dedicated leaders, Laurens came to the forefront and 
through his encouragement was able to hold the legislature together.                                    
 When a dispute between George Washington and General Thomas Conway 
threatened the stability of the Continental Army, Laurens was faced with a potentially 
dangerous political conflict.  The Conway-Washington dispute represented a very real 
threat to the continuance of the American cause.  Furthermore, any conspiracy to 
undermine the authority of General Washington was also a direct threat to the French 
alliance.  Receiving information from his son, Laurens endeavored to prevent knowledge 
of this dispute from reaching the public.  He also worked to calm the tensions between 
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the two generals before others had the opportunity to take sides.  When all the facts had 
been presented, Laurens determined that General Conway was the root cause of the 
internal conflict.  Laurens publicly supported General Washington and curtailed any 
potential movements to undermine his command of the Continental Army.   
 Moreover, Washington’s friendship with the Marquis de Lafayette presented a 
potentially damaging diplomatic quagmire.  Angered at the insubordinate attitude of 
General Conway, Lafayette demanded that the government take decisive disciplinary 
action on the matter.  Laurens feared that Lafayette would withdraw his support of the 
revolution if the American government did not support the Commander-in-Chief.  Were 
Lafayette to resign his commission in the army and return to France, the financial and 
military support needed by the Americans would evaporate.  Fortunately, Laurens was 
able to maintain a firm grip on the conspiracies that perplexed the American military 
during the winter of 1777-1778.  The French alliance was maintained, and Lafayette 
gained a greater respect for Laurens, thanks to his public support of Washington amid the 
criticism of his subalterns.   
 Diplomacy was at the center of Laurens national service.  His term as president 
was an effort to reach out to the essential players in the American Revolution.  When the 
states faltered in their representations, Laurens evoked the revolutionary spirit of the 
individual state governments and encouraged them to take a more active stance in the 
affairs of the national government.  It wasn’t just their own state that they were fighting 
for, it was the liberty of a new nation.   
 To prevent the dissolution of the military, Laurens urged an atmosphere of 
cooperation between the state militia leaders and the regional commanders of the 
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Continental Army.  To maintain the military and commercial alliance with the French, 
Laurens urged the government to ignore any attempts by the British to generate a rift 
between America and France.  He further argued that there could be no discussion about 
the end of hostilities without England’s public acknowledgement of the sovereign status 
of the United States.  His dealings with the Carlisle peace commission represent his 
determination to see the thirteen colonies recognized as free and independent states.  
Throughout his public interaction with representatives of the British government, the man 
who had once espoused reconciliation with Great Britain came out as America’s most 
fervent advocate.   
 Henry Laurens maintained the delicate balance between the interests of the 
individual states and the nation as a whole throughout his presidency.  In his public 
service he was both a diplomat and a crisis manager.  His service to the American 
Revolution cannot be overlooked.  Without his determination and tireless efforts, the 
revolution would have descended into chaos.  Without his sometimes genuflecting 
relationship with the French, the United States would have lost its strongest ally in its 
quest for independence.  Laurens took on the burden of leadership in a position that 
contained no definition of authority.  The concept of a chief executive was alien to the 
United States that Henry Laurens served.  However, necessity demanded a firm leader in 
the midst of the winter of 1777-1778, and Henry Laurens fulfilled that demand 
admirably. 
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